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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines Hannibal Barca and his role in the Second Punic War while 
scrutinizing his battle tactics to gain perspective on his military campaigns. Hannibal was the 
first Carthaginian general known to have been educated in Greek warfare. This training coupled 
with his natural affinity for warfare gave him a distinct advantage because the Greeks had 
developed the most advanced military theories and tactics of the time. There are no extant 
autobiographies of Hannibal or Carthaginian works on Hannibal, which has resulted in a 
historiographical bias. This thesis focuses on Hannibal’s battle tactics in order to present this 
argument in as direct and unbiased a format as possible. A reexamination of Hannibal’s tactics  
makes dissecting the imbalance between the ancient, primary sources and modern, secondary 
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CH 1:  HISTORIOGRAPHY  
The historiography on Hannibal suffers from a Roman bias. The struggles of Carthage’s 
greatest son are reflected in the scattered historical writings of Rome, its most hated enemy. The 
lack of contemporaneous sources and the poor state of existing evidence have made it difficult 
for scholars to analyze Hannibal’s accomplishments. Educated Greeks such as Silenus and 
Sosylus traveled with Hannibal and wrote about him during his campaigns, but none of their 
work survived.  
Modern historiography often portrays Hannibal in the kind light of hindsight and hero 
worship. Historians like Dodge are impressed to the point of bias by Hannibal’s exploits, but 
they do not fully explore the possibility that his Greek education may have helped make 
Hannibal a great general. This thesis addresses the imbalance between the ancient and modern 
works, with an emphasis on the theory that his Greek education was fundamental to his success. 
This chapter analyzes the accounts of Polybius and Livy as basic evidence for our 
knowledge of Hannibal. It also includes some briefer remarks on Nepos’ Life of Hannibal, 
Plutarch’s Life of Fabius Maximus, and Silius Italicus’ Punica. The remainder of the chapter 
discusses key points of agreement and contention in the modern scholarship on Hannibal. The 
Latin and Greek translations are from the Loeb Classical Library. 
The Ancient Sources 
 Ancient sources on Hannibal are addressed chronologically. First, Silenus and Sosylus 
were Greek writers who traveled with Hannibal in Spain and Italy during the war. Their works 
are no longer extant. Second, the writings of Polybius and Livy, one Greek and one Latin, are the 
most abundant surviving historical sources on the Punic general. They wrote around a century 




authors such as Cornelius Nepos and Plutarch studied Hannibal in both a historical and cultural 
context, making them useful for understanding and assessing Hannibal’s legacy.  
 The loss of all contemporaneous works is a major obstacle to historians. Silenus and 
Sosylus were key individuals in the Carthaginian camp.  Sosylus was Hannibal’s tutor in Greek 
language and literature, and Silenus wrote an official history of the campaign, which Polybius, 
Coelius Antipater, and Livy later used as a source.1 The loss of their work diminishes our 
understanding of their role, but allusions to them by later Roman authors point to their 
importance. Both historians were writing for a larger, Greek-speaking audience, and they 
chronicled the Second Punic War from the Carthaginian perspective. It is important to remember 
their loss while reading later authors on the subject.2  
Polybius 
Polybius was a Greek historian of the second century BCE.3 He was born into a wealthy 
family in Megalopolis in the Peloponnese, where Rome and Macedon struggled for domination. 
The Achaean League, a confederation of the towns of Achaea threatened by Sparta, allied itself 
with Macedon to protect its interests. Their combined success gave the Achaean League control 
over the Peloponnese, where it became increasingly difficult to maintain political independence 
from Rome. In 168, Rome defeated Macedon in the battle of Pydna and forced the Achaean 
League to surrender hostages from its leading families. Polybius, being from a prominent family, 
became a hostage in Rome. He thrived in the Scipionic Circle, a philhellenic group of Roman 
                                              
 
1 F.W. Walbank, “Silenus,” in The Oxford Classical Dictionary, 4th ed. (Oxford, U.K: 
Oxford University Press, 2012), 1407. 
2 See Polyb., 3.20.5 for criticism of Sosylus. 




aristocrats with coherent cultural, literary, and political ideals under the leadership of Scipio 
Aemilianus.4     
In Rome, Polybius quickly formed a friendship with and became the advisor of Scipio 
Aemilianus. The Scipiones were an influential Roman family. Their patriarch, Scipio Africanus 
Maior, was the general who ended the Second Punic War (201 BCE) by defeating Carthage in 
Spain and North Africa. The Scipionic Circle gave Polybius access to essential members of the 
Roman ruling class, family archives, and possibly even state historical archives. This access 
allowed him unparalleled research access for a foreign historian, and his pro-Roman perspective 
reflects this privilege and biased view.5  
Using his newfound patronage, Polybius wrote world history and traveled extensively. 
For his research on the Second Punic War, he toured Spain, Gaul, and North Africa. He 
interviewed important individuals and eyewitnesses to the conflict, including Massinissa, the 
Numidian king crucial to Rome’s victory against Hannibal. In 146, Polybius witnessed the 
destruction of the city of Carthage by Scipio Aemilianus, which ended the Third Punic War. 
Morbidly inspired by the loss of the great city, he trekked along the North African coast and 
retraced Hannibal’s route from Spain through the Alps. In southern Italy, Polybius consulted a 
bronze table Hannibal had left with an inscription of his exploits, his res gestae, which provided 
Polybius with accurate numerical data and a primary source from Hannibal himself.6  
Polybius’ goal in writing a world history was to explain the rise of Roman power to the 
rest of the world, especially his fellow Greeks. He was loyal to his native land despite the long 
                                              
 
4 P. Derow, “Polybius,” in The Oxford Classical Dictionary, 1209.  
5 Ronald Mellor, The Historians of Ancient Rome (Routledge: New York, 2013), 11. 




years spent abroad. He wrote in Greek, not only because it was the current universal 
Mediterranean language but because he was struggling to explain the events which led to the end 
of Greece’s political autonomy to the Greek people. 
Rome’s conflict with Carthage became the focus of Polybius’ work because the Punic 
wars propelled Rome to the status of world power. His universal history covered events 
throughout the world, including Greece and the Near East. Compared to the titanic struggle in 
the western Mediterranean, however, the conflicts of the Greek peninsula and the Near East 
seemed like a distraction from the main event. Polybius used this comparison to show other 
states’ obliviousness to Rome’s rise, and that, before the destruction of Corinth, Rome had not 
demonstrated any interest in expanding further eastward. It is through Polybius’ history that we 
know Hannibal enjoyed a brief political career in Carthage after the Second Punic War. He was 
later forced into exile, where he traveled to different Eastern kingdoms, warning them about 
Rome. In 189, the Seleucid Antiochus III went to war with Rome on Hannibal’s advice; 
Antiochus led his army into Greece, but the Romans rebuffed him near Thermopylae. Rome later 
subsumed the Seleucids as well.   
The structure of Polybius’ narrative ingeniously combined chronological and 
geographical events. Polybius divided his narrative vertically by Olympiads and horizontally 
with each year in a fixed progression from west to east beginning in Italy and proceeding to 
Greece, Macedonia, Asia, and Egypt. His methodology included the study of documents, written 
memoirs, geography, and eyewitness interviews. His focus was on political actions, but his 
definition of political was broad in scope.7 Polybius aimed to explain events in a multifaceted 
                                              
 




way rather than to assign responsibility to one person or group. “Beginnings are actions; actions 
are preceded by decisions to act; decisions to act are processes involving various elements: a 
proper explanation, for Polybius, must delineate these processes and identify these various 
elements.”8    
Polybius is the extant source written closest to the events of the Second Punic War. 
Unfortunately, Polybius wrote his work from the victors’ point of view. He was heavily 
influenced both by his Roman patrons and his desire to show the Scipio family in a good light. 
Positive descriptions of the Scipiones can be found throughout the Histories, especially the elder 
Publius Cornelius Scipio.  
Polybius explained not only the methods by which Rome conquered the world but also 
the reasons for Rome’s success. On an abstract level, the Greek historian attributes Rome’s rise 
to Tyche (Fortune), but Polybius credits Rome’s superior morals, system of government, and 
military organization as the tools which allowed the Romans to conquer the Mediterranean.9 
Ancient historians all moralize to some degree, and Polybius is no different. As a historian, he 
followed in the footsteps of Thucydides. Polybius’ motives for writing his universal history were 
political in origin,10 and his narrative was not sufficient for himself without his giving an 
examination of cause and effect. He frequently attacked other authors, like Timaeus, for not 
meeting the standards of historical writing he developed throughout his career.11 
Polybius’ standards have remained a measure by which to judge other historians. These 
standards, like those of Thucydides, include personal political experience, in-depth geographic 
                                              
 
8 P. Derow, “Polybius,” in Oxford Classical Dictionary, 1210. 
9 Polyb., 1.1.5, 6.1.1. 
10 Mellor, Historians of Ancient Rome, 10. 




knowledge (by personal travel), and documentary research. His assessment of sources 
exemplifies a critical practice for all historians. Other critical practices included personal 
interviews with eyewitnesses, the examination of inscriptions, and a review of documents from 
the period.12 Polybius’ historiographic standard and his near contemporaneity with his subject 
matter make his work the most reliable surviving source available on Hannibal and the Second 
Punic War. In book 3, which deals with the Second Punic War, Polybius shows little bias when 
he discusses the factors that led to it. He charges both Rome and Carthage with misconduct, 
brinksmanship, and treachery. However, his biases surface in his conclusion that the explanation 
for the war was the hatred of Rome by Carthage’s elite military family, the Barcids.     
Livy 
Livy lived long after Polybius and did not meet the Greek historian’s methodological 
standards. Polybius had personal political and military experience, travel experience across the 
Mediterranean, and access to private records and probably Roman state archives. Livy had none 
of these. Livy grew up in northern Italy and never held high political office or served in the 
Senate. He had no military experience, and his apparent lack of travel led him to rely almost 
entirely on books for geographical and topographical information. Without political connections 
Livy had little, if any, direct access to relevant state or personal documents. He leaned heavily on 
Polybius and previous annalists such as Coelius Antipater. The princeps Augustus sponsored his 
work on a history of Rome, which encapsulated the idealism of the early Republic, the Ab Urbe 
Condita.13  
                                              
 
12 Mellor, Historians of Ancient Rome, 11. 




Polybius would have faulted Livy’s historical method. Livy’s heavy reliance on 
secondary sources hinders his perspective on historical causes. Livy’s basic value as evidence 
lies in the cohesive linear and narrative quality of his work. His goal, much like that of Polybius, 
was to write a history of Rome, but his Ab Urbe Condita, intended for a Roman audience, is a 
synthesis of legend, history, patriotism, and drama. He wrote it more than one-hundred-fifty 
years after the Second Punic War, and he repeats errors present in previous sources. Livy’s 
account of Hannibal’s route through the Alps, for example, is copied almost word for word from 
Polybius.14 Livy’s work reflects the moralistic bias common to ancient historians; he portrays 
individuals as entirely good or evil, with Roman characters mainly in the former category. The 
speeches given in his work are fictitious, but Livy presents them as direct quotations. This 
practice follows in Thucydides’ historiographic tradition, which provides the locus classicus for 
discussing speeches in all ancient histories: 
My habit has been to make the speakers say what was in my opinion demanded of them 
by the various occasions, of course adhering as closely as possible to the general sense of 
what they really said.15  
Livy uses quotes from earlier sources, then builds epic monologues around the idealized 
personas he created in his text.  
  Hannibal was one of the most challenging characters for Livy. Like all other authors, 
Livy acknowledged the Punic general’s military acumen. He accused Hannibal of cruelty, 
treachery, impiety, and “a total disregard for […] all that other men hold sacred.”16 His 
                                              
 
14 See Polyb., 3.54.4-55; Livy, 21.35.10-37. 
15 Thuc., 1.22. 




subsequent lionizing of the elder Scipio Africanus is a reflection of his own Roman bias and the 
bias of earlier sources such as Polybius. This is because Roman authors needed someone equal in 
talent and superior in morality in order to assert the Roman sense of their own moral superiority. 
The wickedness of Hannibal also brings up the idea of alleged Punic “reliability” (fides Punica), 
which will be addressed in chapter five. 
Livy was the first to introduce a fully developed periodic structure into Latin 
historiography. His mixture of direct and indirect speech became a feature of his technique, as 
well as his use of poetic or archaic words, a practice avoided by writers such as Cicero and 
Caesar. This language was specific to individual episodes in Roman history in the first decade of 
Livy’s work, which treats Rome’s legendary origins. Later episodes that share this practice 
include the story of the Bacchanalia and the account of the death of Cicero.17 Livy was a patriotic 
writer but never refers to the Romans in the narrative as “our men” or “our army.” He aimed to 
chronicle the rise of Rome and highlight the virtues responsible for their success. Like other 
ancient historians, his work tried to reinforce and improve the morality of its audience.18  
Without any personal experience in war, politics, or travel, Livy’s value as evidence can 
be confusing. Tacitus states that Livy was famous for his eloquence and truthfulness.19 His Ab 
Urbe Condita inspired the citizens of imperial Rome with an idealistic vision that recalled a 
bygone age. He belonged to a historiographic tradition that included Sallust, though he did not 
follow the methodology of Thucydides and Polybius as carefully as Sallust did.20 Roman authors 
                                              
 
17 J. Briscoe, “Livy,” Oxford Classical Dictionary, 878. See Livy, 39 for Bacchanalia; 
Livy, Per. 120 for the death of Cicero.  
18 Livy, pref. 10 
19 Tac., Ann., 4.34.1. 




built their visions of Rome based on Livy’s extensive work. The poet Silius Italicus used Livy as 
the main source for his Punica, an epic on the Second Punic War which will be discussed in the 
next section of this chapter. Sixteenth-century scholars across Europe translated Livy’s work, 
and, untranslated, it became a standard for teaching the Latin language. Livy’s influence is 
widespread because so much of his work is extant. Although his Roman bias is palpable, his 
writing is strong enough to act as a counterbalance. Apart from Polybius, Livy is the most 
comprehensive source modern readers have on the Second Punic War. In J.F. Lazenby's words, 
“if where Polybius fails us, we reject Livy’s account of the war, we must abandon any attempt to 
write a history of it.”21  
Other Ancient Evidence 
The next group of sources consists of biographers, historians, and others removed from 
the conflict by centuries. These sources reflect Hannibal’s legacy in the ancient world. It is a 
legacy warped by surviving pro-Roman sources, and, as such, needs correction. Carthaginian 
sources would be the best way to counteract Roman biases, but the libraries of both Carthage and 
Alexandria were destroyed, the former by conquering Roman legions and the latter through 
arson. There is no telling what information resided in the library of Carthage or the famed library 
at Alexandria that could have balanced the historiographic perspective on Hannibal.  
The genre of biography, which developed through the works of authors such as Cornelius 
Nepos and Plutarch, began as a component of historical writing, but ultimately developed into a 
genre of its own, unrestrained by the rules of historical method. The lives of great men, such as  
kings, generals, politicians, philosophers, and poets, became case studies for generals and leaders 
                                              
 
21 J.F. Lazenby, Hannibal’s War: A Military History of the Second Punic War 




to emulate or learn from their mistakes. Military leaders were a necessary focus, given the 
importance of warfare in the ancient world. The works of Nepos and Plutarch were separated by 
more than a century, but both chose to write on famous generals, including Hannibal. Their 
works influenced later Roman writers such as Tacitus, Lucian, and Suetonius.  
Cornelius Nepos was a first-century Roman author who pioneered biography as a genre. 
His only extant works are biographies of famous military commanders, including Hannibal. 
Nepos’ work was biographical rather than historical, so Polybius’ standards do not apply. He was 
not involved in politics and did not serve in the army. He was wealthy but nonpolitical, though 
he did correspond with the likes of Cicero and Catullus. This lack of experience necessitated his 
reliance on previous works such as Polybius.22  
His work makes him the earliest extant biographer in Latin. He is labeled an “intellectual 
pygmy” by Nicholas Horsfall because his writing includes hasty, careless composition and a lack 
of control over his material. Horsfall describes Nepos’ everyday style as “eulogistic, with an 
ethical aim, apparently aimed at a ‘middlebrow’ Roman audience with limited knowledge of 
Greek.”23 His goal likely was to make the great men of history accessible to a broader Roman 
audience.24 
Nepos appreciated Hannibal as a general without vilifying him, and his unwillingness to 
slander the Punic general is a welcome respite from other Roman authors.25 Unfortunately, his 
work lacks military detail and gives no new insight into Hannibal as a commander or a person. 
                                              
 
22 J.C. Rolfe, “Cornelius Nepos,” Oxford Classical Dictionary, 396. 
23 Nicholas Horsfall, "Prose and Mime," in The Cambridge History of Classical 
Literature, eds. E. J. Kenney and W. V. Clausen, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1982), 286. 
24 Ibid., 287. 




Colorful episodes like the ruse of the Falernian cattle and the deception of the Cretans portray the 
Punic general with dramatic flair but do nothing to illuminate his character beyond showing his 
general cleverness. Ancient biographies focused on the narrative of life but also needed to draw 
moral lessons. Nepos’ pure, clear writing style targeted the public at large rather than the 
educated elite. The moral lessons Nepos draws from Hannibal’s life are not as heavy-handed as 
those of other authors. Rather than explicitly moralizing, Nepos relies on anecdotes to highlight 
desirable qualities in his subjects, which allowed Roman readers to learn about the moral 
character of his biographical subjects without prior knowledge of them. 
Silius Italicus was a Roman politician and poet. He lived during the early Roman Empire. 
His best-known work is the Punica, an epic poem on the Second Punic War written in the style 
of Virgil. It is the longest surviving poem in Latin at over twelve thousand lines in seventeen 
books. He organized his fifteen-year history of the war around the battle of Cannae in 216. 
Books eight through ten describe the battle, with seven books before and seven afterward. Livy 
was the historical source behind the poet’s work. 
The poem states that the Second Punic War is the fulfillment of Dido’s curse against 
Aeneas, the legendary ancestor of Rome’s founders.26 This mythological dimension is a thematic 
issue throughout the work. Hannibal is presented as a tool of Juno’s rage, not just as a human 
antagonist. The gods are divine characters in the poem, which follows the traditional view of the 
divine sanction for Rome’s imperial destiny. Modern critics censure Italicus for not following 
Lucan’s example and removing divine characters from the narrative. The goals of epic poetry are 
not the same as historical works, however, and Italicus’ poem brims with nostalgia for a simpler, 
                                              
 




nobler past. It is also brimming with apprehension that Rome’s victory over Carthage might have 
held the seeds of its contemporary decline in imperial times. This acts as the second major theme 
of the Punica, which other authors, such as Livy, also explored.27    
Claire Stocks discusses the process of cultural integration in Silius Italicus’ Punica. Her 
study treats the Punica as a cultural biography, and, in this context, she discusses Italicus’ work 
alongside other ancient biographers. Stocks explores Hannibal’s status as a cultural icon, setting 
him up as being “both model for, and reflection of, Rome’s uiri,” sometimes, even as more 
Roman than they.28 Multiple Roman heroes, such as Marcellus and Scipio Africanus, are needed 
“as the positive, multiple exemplars to offset the ostensibly negative, individual, Hannibal.” 29 
Stocks concludes that Hannibal is the one enemy that best exemplifies the ideal of Romanitas.30 
This theme parallels the view of other Roman authors, who like Italicus, saw the seeds of 
Rome’s moral decline begin with its defeat of Carthage in the Second Punic War.31 
Plutarch was a philosopher and biographer who lived in the late first and early second 
century CE He spent most of his life in Greece but visited Italy and Egypt, and he lectured in 
Rome. He was a priest at Delphi during the last thirty years of his life and posited a partnership 
between Greece as a cultural educator and Rome as a high power. He wrote dialogues in the style 
of Aristotle and Cicero, marked by long speeches, characterization, and observations. The object 
of his work was not to write continuous political history but to exemplify virtue or vice 
                                              
 
27 D. Feeney, “Silius Italicus,” Oxford Classical Dictionary, 1407. 
28 Claire Stocks, The Roman Hannibal: Remembering the Enemy in Silius Italicus’ 
‘Punica’ (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2014), 18; 232. 
29 Ibid., 12. 
30 Ibid., 79. 
31 John Jacobs, rev. “Claire Stocks, The Roman Hannibal” (Bryn Mawr Classical Review, 




individually in the careers of great men. He paid particular attention to education, anecdotes, and 
the development and revelation of character. The general pattern of his Lives includes (1) family; 
(2) education; (3) public debut; (4) climaxes; (5) change of fortune; (6) latter years; and (7) 
death.32     
Hannibal is portrayed indirectly in Plutarch’s Life of Fabius Maximus, a depiction 
noteworthy for its lack of Roman bias. Literary critics point out that Plutarch dwells on the 
strengths rather than weaknesses of his characters. Since ancient biographies focus on the moral 
interpretation of the individual, emphasizing strengths is an expected byproduct. 
  The Life of Fabius Maximus provides perspectives on both Hannibal and his main Roman 
adversary. Plutarch presents Fabius as the type of character Rome needed in order to survive as a 
state. Religious observance is paramount in Fabius’ character. Only his observance of the 
auspices, for example, kept Fabius from being ambushed by Hannibal.33 Roman writers decried 
military tactics like ambushes as treacherous and cowardly. The term Punic faith, or fides 
Punica, was used ironically to describe the tricks and deceptions used by Carthaginians in 
warfare, diplomacy, commerce, and other aspects of life. Although mostly a stereotype, the term 
came to define the disdain early Romans had for tactics and strategies that relied on subterfuge 
rather than brute force. Fabius Maximus was critical in adopting deceit as a Roman tactic, and he 
did so directly in response to Hannibal’s success in Italy.34  
                                              
 
32 D. Russell, “Plutarch,” Oxford Classical Dictionary, 1200. 
33 Plut., Fab, 19.6. 
34 J.E. Lendon, Soldiers and Ghosts: A History of Battle in Classical Antiquity (Yale 




Plutarch credits Roman success against Hannibal to Fabius’ delaying strategy and the 
enervating power of the city of Capua.35 Plutarch posits that Capua reduced the effectiveness of 
Hannibal’s army’s as a fighting force. This analysis is an apparent moral hyperbole that Plutarch 
uses to decry the corruption of city life in Rome. He often overstates situations for dramatic 
effect, for example, describing an earthquake that “destroyed several cities, diverted rivers from 
their channels and split off great fragments of cliffs” during the battle of Lake Trasimene.36 
Other dramatic events include: (1) the trap at Casilinum, which resulted in the legendary ruse of 
the flaming oxen; (2) Hannibal’s mispronouncing a Latin name as the reason his guides led the 
army astray; and (3) a windstorm at Cannae sweeping into the Roman front line, impairing the 
soldiers’ sight.37 After Cannae, Plutarch states that Hannibal “brought the whole of Italy under 
his control,”38 a deliberate exaggeration to illustrate the shift in momentum at that point in the 
war.  
 Plutarch’s works are some of the main sources for understanding the Greek and Roman 
world. The pitfalls of his work, including the lack of historical perspective and simplistic moral 
attitudes, sometimes lead to doubt about its viability as source material. If treated with caution, 
ancient biographies like Plutarch’s can help to piece together Hannibal’s legacy. Romans vilified 
Hannibal for invading Italy. Roman society as a whole was damaged psychologically, and after 
his death, vengeful Roman writers purposely maligned Hannibal’s reputation. His legacy 
occasionally outshone this bias, as we begin to see in the biographies of Nepos and Plutarch. 
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Their admiration and respect point to a new chapter in Hannibal’s historiography, which in turn 
has allowed for the revival of his legacy in modern times. 
Modern Scholarship  
  Modern scholarship has scrubbed Hannibal’s reputation spotless. History now considers 
him one of the three greatest ancient military leaders alongside Alexander and Caesar. It is 
interesting that of these men, Hannibal is the only one who lost the war he started. Alexander’s 
empire fell apart before his body turned cold, and Caesar died before he could shape the 
foundation of the Roman Empire. These chance events overshadow their military 
accomplishments. Hannibal’s defeat in the Second Punic War breaks this pattern. Scipio 
Africanus defeated him at the Battle of Zama in 202. Unlike Alexander and Caesar, victorious 
but ultimately unsuccessful in their goals, Hannibal was neither victorious in the long run nor 
successful in achieving his primary goal of defeating Rome and restoring Carthaginian power in 
the Mediterranean. Livy’s popularity in Europe during the Neo-Classical period might explain 
this trend among modern writers to lionize Hannibal. Napoleon himself praised Hannibal as an 
admirable leader.39  
Theodore Dodge credits Hannibal with changing warfare entirely:  
 
That war could be waged by avoiding in lieu of seeking battle; that the results of a victory 
could be earned by attacks upon the enemy's communications, by flank-maneuvers, by 
seizing positions from which safely to threaten him in case he moved, was not 
understood. That it did so was due to the teaching of Hannibal.40  
 
He then compares Hannibal to Alexander the Great in terms of vision and ability. However, the 
tactics he refers to were already well established in Greek warfare, as chapter two illustrates. 
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Hannibal’s Greek education, including its military side, gave him an advantage over other 
Carthaginian and Roman generals. This was the first time these tactics were fully brought to bear 
against the Romans, which caused a paradigm shift in their method of warfare. The extent to 
which Hannibal changed warfare is discussed further in chapter five.  
  This idealizing trend is recognized by Hans Delbrück when he compares Hannibal and 
Napoleon as the two great commanders of world history. They are “so great that history has 
always been tempted to judge their conquerors more sternly than it judged them, just so that the 
idea would not arise that the conqueror was greater than the conquered.”41 Delbrück places the 
victorious Scipio Africanus at Hannibal’s side as an equal , in contrast to other modern scholars’ 
grudging admission of Scipio’s competence, which in turn contrasts with ancient authors’ 
resentful praise of Hannibal.  
 J.F. Lazenby compares Hannibal to both Napoleon and Robert E. Lee and finds them 
both wanting. He argues that Hannibal’s ability to campaign for so long in Italy is the true mark 
of his military ability rather than his stunning campaign. When these two generals faced defeat in 
Russia and at Gettysburg, respectively, their surrenders afterward were swift compared to 
Hannibal’s. He refused to admit defeat for over a decade after Cannae, which, although 
technically a victory, did not force Rome to capitulate as expected. His government finally had to 
recall him to protect his threatened homeland.42   
  According to Serge Lancel, Hannibal should be considered the first international hero. He 
points out that Hannibal was not limited by his culture, as was Alexander the Great. His tactical 
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genius and leadership were not limited to Carthaginian, Greek, or Latin culture. He superseded 
cultural barriers and became a great leader who fought for the honor of his country.43 Hannibal’s 
army consisted largely of mercenaries uniquely equipped both materially and tactically. It is to 
Hannibal’s credit that he was able to wield this multifaceted tool effectively.  
  Richard Gabriel provides the most telling example of the modern bias toward Hannibal 
yet. Gabriel claims that no general, ancient or modern, equals Hannibal. His criteria for this 
claim include the fact that no other Western general (1) campaigned for so long; (2) fought so 
many battles; (3) won so many victories; and (4) extricated his army so successfully from a war 
zone. By these standards, Gabriel claims Hannibal was “greater than Napoleon, Frederick the 
Great, Wellington, and even Alexander.”44 He was only defeated at Zama “under conditions so 
unfavorable that it is unlikely that any general could have succeeded where Hannibal failed.”45     
 These examples illustrate a more significant issue. Modern scholars portray Hannibal 
with hindsight and hero worship. These historians are impressed to the point of bias by 
Hannibal’s exploits and admire the Carthaginian general as a tragic underdog. Scholars in the 
future need to have a more balanced perspective. Hannibal Barca was a brilliant general whose 
accomplishments should be studied for what they were, not for what they might have been, and 
not for what critics wish they were.  
Modern criticisms of Hannibal are few and far between. B.D. Hoyos comes closest to 
providing an accurate assessment of Hannibal’s strategic and tactical acumen. The author 
provides a critical reassessment of Hannibal’s strategy in invading Italy, as well as his conduct of 
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the war after Cannae, including his decision not to march on Rome after the battle of Cannae. He 
questions modern depictions of the Punic general as a “military genius with limitations” by 
criticizing the timetable of Hannibal’s Alpine crossing, Carthage’s failure at naval rearmament, 
its wasteful reinforcement strategy, and Hannibal’s delay in investing Rome after Cannae. Hoyos 
holds Hannibal responsible for all these strategic failures, citing Polybius’ assertion that the 
Carthaginian general made all wartime decisions.46 The author commends Hannibal for his 
leadership capabilities but rejects the idea of Hannibal as a Hellenistic military genius.  
This chapter has covered a wide range of introductory topics concerning the Second 
Punic War. The state of the primary sources is the crux of the historiographical issue. There is a 
dearth of pro-Carthaginian sources or even third-party authors that could balance the issue. The 
Greek Polybius repaid Rome’s patronage with a dazzling portrait of Scipio Africanus. His 
standards for historical writing provided a framework to which future historians and 
contemporaries alike could aspire. Livy, the Roman patriot, leaned heavily on Polybius and 
earlier sources, now lost, to create his magnum opus. His history of Rome created a bright, 
burning nationalism in the Empire that carried the image of Rome through the Dark Ages and 
down to the present day. Plutarch, the provincial biographer, provides an outside perspective on 
Hannibal and his war, using a moral framework of the events to create a template for future 
generals and kings to follow. Lastly, Cornelius Nepos, the poet, shows through his biography the 
cracks in Rome’s long-standing hatred of the Carthaginian invader. Respect breaks in, and 
history no longer condemns Hannibal. Each of these sources is crucial to understanding the 
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information available on the Second Punic War and its most famous general. They also reveal 
pro-Roman bias.  
Modern scholarship on Hannibal lacks appreciation for the Greek education he received 
under the guidance of his father, Hamilcar. His brothers were also recipients of this education, 
and it was the primary reason for the caliber of their generalship, which far outstripped that of 
the average Carthaginian leader. This thesis provides an offset to the positive bias in modern 
scholarship while still giving credit to Hannibal for his strategy and tactics. 
 
CH 2: CARTHAGINIAN BACKGROUND  
 Carthage was a Phoenician colony of Tyre founded in 814. Located in modern Tunisia, 
Qart-ḥadašt, or “new city,” was founded, according to legend, by Queen Dido. It remained a 
dependent of Tyre until 650. Carthage was a thalassocracy. It relied on its network of maritime 
trade routes for wealth and manpower. The string of Phoenician merchant cities along the coast 
of North Africa, southern Spain, and the islands of the western Mediterranean formed the 
foundation of this network. Carthage established a commercial monopoly in the western 
Mediterranean by the end of the sixth century.47 These circumstances were the result of the battle 
of Alalia in 535, in which a Carthaginian-Etruscan alliance defeated a Greek fleet off the coast of 
Corsica. This military victory excluded Greeks and others from Spain, though Greek merchant 
cities had already been established in southern France, a fact that would become important in the 
geopolitical situation later on. Until the First Punic War, Carthaginian ships ruled the western 
seas.  
 The First Punic War lasted from 264 to 241. Maritime supremacy was critical to Rome’s 
victory over Carthage. Despite being able to field a superior land army, Rome was powerless to 
support it because of its lack of a strong navy. Sicily became the focal point of the war. Rome 
was unable to effectively besiege coastal cities on the island until it controlled access to the sea, 
which would prevent the Carthaginian navy from being able to supply their cities with food and 
reinforcements. On land, the Carthaginian general Hamilcar Barca used hit-and-run guerrilla 
tactics to counter Roman numerical superiority.  
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  After Carthage’s last fleet sank at the Battle of the Aegates Islands in 241, the 
Carthaginian Senate ordered Hamilcar to come to terms with Rome. Unable to be resupplied, 
Hamilcar surrendered and returned to Carthage. Despite the protraction of the conflict and the 
massive loss of life, Hamilcar did not agree with his government’s decision to abandon Sicily.48  
  Carthage’s prospects fell after the war. It abandoned Sicily, and war debt was placed 
firmly on the city’s shoulders. Rome was in control of the western Mediterranean Sea, and 
Carthage’s navy was nonexistent. Hamilcar returned to his estates embittered. There was a 
possibility that the city fathers would crucify him for his failure. That danger passed, however, as 
Carthage plunged into another conflict.  
   The Truceless War, as it came to be known, was a rebellion that occurred from 241-237 
in North Africa. The mercenary army that Hamilcar had brought back to Carthage rebelled after 
the Senate attempted to renegotiate their payment. Freed slaves, Libyans, and other tribes flocked 
to the rebellion. Their initial military successes sidelined Carthage’s traditional allies , the 
Numidians. Local tribes began to waver as different chieftains considered siding with the rebels. 
Sardinia quickly rebelled as well. Cut off from the rest of North Africa, Carthage recalled 
Hamilcar Barca to resume leadership of the army. He fought fiercely for two years until he 
defeated the rebel army at the battle of the Saw in 237. North Africa was brought back under 
Carthage’s control, and the city was secured.49  
 In 238, Rome took advantage of Carthage’s predicament during the rebellion to seize 
Sardinia. Neither Rome nor Carthage sent troops to Sardinia during this diplomatic stand-off. 
Without a navy and having just recovered from an almost fatal rebellion, Carthage was in no 
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position to argue. It agreed to surrender Sardinia. To add insult to injury, Rome, fearing 
Carthage’s returning economic power, added twelve hundred talents to the already substantial 
war debt.50 Rome’s unprovoked treaty-breaking concerning Sardinia poisoned diplomatic 
relations with Carthage and paved the way for another war between the two powers.   
 Though weakened, Carthage was secured. Hamilcar had saved his country from an 
unmitigated disaster. Determined to find new sources of wealth, men, and resources, Hamilcar 
left for Spain with an army to expand Carthage’s territory. Trading outposts along the southern 
coast and nearby islands had existed for centuries. The mineral wealth, including silver, lay in 
the interior. Hamilcar’s plan to reestablish Carthage went through Spain.   
Carthage in Spain  
  
Hamilcar arrived in Gades, Spain, in 237. The whole coastal strip of lower Andalusia was 
already within Carthage’s sphere of influence, but it did not directly control the region. Lancel 
describes Carthage as a “privileged commercial and cultural partner,” along with the Greeks, 
who were competing with Carthage to distribute glazed pottery and other trade items to the local 
Spanish tribes.51 Polybius describes Hamilcar’s expansion as a reconquest aimed at “re-
establishing the Carthaginians’ affairs in Iberia.”52 For nine years, Hamilcar fought against the 
Iberian tribes to bring southern Spain under Carthage’s control. He founded the city of Akra 
Leuke in 231 to solidify his holdings and pacify the newly conquered region.53  
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  The reconquest of Spain had immediate benefits for Carthage. Hamilcar reorganized the 
mines in the Sierra Morena and began distributing silver coinage.54 In 231, a Roman embassy 
traveled to Spain to meet with Hamilcar. They asked him what his purpose was in Spain, and he 
replied that he was fighting to pay off Carthage’s indemnity to Rome.55 This diplomatic answer 
belied the growing political tension between the two powers. In 229, Hamilcar died in battle 
against the Iberian tribes. At the time of his death, Carthage had extended its territory from 
Gades to Alicante and had extended out to Cap de la Nao on the eastern tip of the Peninsula. His 
son-in-law, Hasdrubal the Fair, then took command.  
 Hasdrubal had served as Hamilcar’s faithful lieutenant in Spain for years. He also played 
a critical political role before Hamilcar’s departure for Spain. In addition to marrying Hamilcar’s 
second daughter, Hasdrubal had used his political influence to help Hamilcar escape prosecution 
by the Carthaginian Senate following the Truceless War.56 The Senate had tried to blame 
Hamilcar for the rebellion by accusing him of making promises to his mercenaries that he could 
not guarantee while his army campaigned in Sicily. Hasdrubal had gained influence through 
bribery and political corruption. He continued these tactics after inheriting Hamilcar’s position in 
Spain, which earned him political enemies in Carthage.57  
  Hasdrubal’s first action was to avenge Hamilcar’s death. He assembled a force of fifty-
six thousand men and two hundred elephants. Diodorus Siculus states that Hasdrubal seized the 
“twelve towns of the Oretani and all the towns in Iberia.”58 Carthage now effectively controlled 
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southeast Spain. Hasdrubal further solidified this conquest by marrying the daughter of an 
Iberian chieftain. Iberian cultural ideas of loyalty centered on a person rather than a state. Allied 
or subjugated tribes saw their alliances with Carthage to be dependent on the Barcid family. This 
attitude created problems of loyalty for Carthage during Rome’s invasion of Spain. It also gave 
credit to the idea that the Barcids had attempted to set up their own independent kingdom.59 
  Hasdrubal was then named supreme chief of the Iberians. The title he chose, according to 
Diodorus, was strategos autokrator, the same title that was given to Alexander the Great by the 
League of Corinth in 335.60 Lancel argues that every ancient general emulated Alexander’s 
actions and that Hasdrubal’s title is an example of imitatio Alexandri.61 The title from Diodorus 
does not necessarily point in this direction, in any case. Diodorus was Greek and may well have 
been translating an utterly different title from the Carthaginian or Iberian tongue. It might be 
Diodorus who was influenced by Alexander.  
  Hasdrubal’s next objective was to establish a new capital to reorganize and center 
Carthaginian Spain on his new conquests. He founded the city of Qart Hadasht, which was later 
called Carthago Nova by the Romans and is known to the modern world as Cartagena. Polybius 
describes it as “a magnificent palace built by Hasdrubal when he aspired to royal power.”62  
  In 226, another Roman embassy arrived in Spain to negotiate with Hasdrubal. Greek 
trading cities along the Mediterranean coast in northeastern Spain and southern Gaul were 
growing wary of Carthage’s growing power in the peninsula. The quick ascent of the 
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Carthaginian Empire frightened cities such as Emporia and Massilia. They worried that Carthage 
would expand into northern Spain and take away their valuable trade network. Emporia and 
Massilia held diplomatic connections with Rome, and they continually sent embassies to Rome 
warning about Carthage.63 Their entreaties led to the first Roman embassy to Hamilcar in 231, 
and now the Romans arrived again in 226 to negotiate with his son-in-law Hasdrubal. The result 
was a treaty that stated that Hasdrubal would maintain the Ebro River as Carthage’s political 
boundary in Spain. He agreed that no army would cross the river armed, effectively containing 
Carthaginian expansion to southern Spain. 64 Hasdrubal was assassinated five years later by a 
slave in Cartagena. 
  The Barcids emphasized diplomatic techniques to acquire new territory for Carthage, 
including political marriages between the Barca family and Spanish royalty. In Hasdrubal’s brief 
time as commander, he controlled the entirety of southeastern Spain and founded the city of 
Cartagena, which became the Punic stronghold in Iberia until the end of the third century, when 
Scipio Africanus conquered it. Often his famous in-laws, Hamilcar and Hannibal, overshadow 
Hasdrubal the Fair, but he was an essential member of the Barcid family who made Hannibal’s 
invasion a feasible strategy. 
Carthaginian Empire or Barcid Empire? 
  Historians today debate whether the Barcids aspired to set up their Spanish kingdom. 
Polybius states that Hamilcar planned to use Spain’s wealth to fuel another war against Rome. 
Hamilcar’s motivation, according to Polybius, was anger for being forced to surrender in Sicily 
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during the First Punic War. Rome’s seizure of Sardinia was another motivation for Hamilcar. 
The “Wrath of the Barcids” then is listed as the leading cause of the Second Punic War.65 The 
question is whether there is enough evidence to support Polybius’ interpretation.  
  It is difficult to judge the intent of a long-dead general. Hamilcar left behind no written 
records that could give insight into his motivations. No Carthaginian sources survive that can 
verify Polybius’ claim. Hamilcar founded a large city and began to distribute coinage, the acts of 
a possibly aspiring Hellenistic monarch but not a warmonger.  Although later a faction in the 
Carthaginian Senate did attempt to blame the Second Punic War on the Barcid family, this was 
during negotiations for surrender at the end of the war and, given the circumstances, must be 
treated with caution. 66    
 Other evidence of a Barcid kingdom in Spain includes the coins minted at Gades 
following the Barcids’ arrival. The silver mined from the Sierra Morena was used to mint new 
coinage that Carthage circulated throughout its empire. On the face of one of the coins in this 
issue is an effigy that is possibly Hasdrubal. Lancel cites the manner of representation as being 
very similar to coins minted by the Ptolemaic dynasty.67 Hannibal later placed his father’s 
portrait in the guise of Herakles-Melkart on the silver issued at New Carthage, according to 
Scullard.68 The images of Herakles-Melkart are displayed with and without a beard. These 
features denote both Hannibal and Hamilcar. Later issues display a profile without laurel wreath 
or Heracles’ club. Scullard believes these are Hannibal because of the lack of symbols such as a 
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diadem or club and variation in facial hair. The coins displayed the Barcids as “Hellenistic rulers 
with a suggestion of the divine.” 69  
  The actions of the Barca family do not seem to reflect a desire to engineer a second war 
with Rome. Hamilcar expanded his country’s holdings to repair the losses from the previous war. 
Hasdrubal continued to expand but did so through political alliances to establish stability. The 
Barcids took Spanish wives and then negotiated a boundary treaty with Rome in 226. This 
behavior seems counter-intuitive to an aggressive Barcid strategy bent on conflict with Rome.  
  The non-literary evidence available lends credit to the idea of a Barcid monarchy in 
Spain. Coin designs are a useful guide to the Barcid “image.” The choice of divine symbols is 
the main testament to the idea that the Barcids were divine. Conclusions to historical questions 
based on numismatic evidence, however, are often subjective.70 It is apparent that the Barcids 
ruled in Spain as vice-regal governors, but the literary evidence states that the Barcids ruled in 
Spain with the approval of the Carthaginian Senate. Founding cities and distributing new 
coinage, while typical behavior of Hellenistic monarchs, is not enough evidence to prove any 
Barcid attempt at an empire. Any exaggeration of Barcid ambition in Spain in the literary 
evidence is the result of an anti-Barcid tradition.71 The extent and definition of that exaggeration, 
of course, remain subjective without new evidence. 
  After twenty years of peace, Carthage had again established itself as a contending power 
for the hegemony of the Mediterranean. Thanks to the military ambitions of the Barcid family, 
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the city’s coffers were full of silver, gold, and the assorted wealth of southern Spain. Ironically, 
the Carthaginian Senate had allowed the Barcid faction to set themselves up as rivals, as well as 
representatives of Carthage. Hasdrubal’s new capital of Qart Hadasht began to rival old Carthage 
as the Punic cultural center of the western Mediterranean. It centered on a large, magnificent 
palace built to reflect the wealth and power of a Hellenistic monarch. This paradox continued 
throughout the third century as the Barcids sought to regain their lost power. Their relocation to 
Spain made the Barcids outsiders to the governing structure at Carthage, but their popularity and 
continued military success ensured political support from their mother city on the brink of 
another war with Rome.  
  Lancel refers to this interlude as more of an armed peace. He argues that the First and 
Second Punic Wars amalgamate into one larger Punic War because of the cold war that occurred 
between Rome and Carthage. The seizure of Sardinia, the alliance with Saguntum, and the Ebro 
treaty of 226, are all examples of Rome’s attempt to curtail Carthage’s revival.  72 
Formation of Hannibal 
 
Examining Hannibal’s youth and education provides a fresh perspective on the tactics 
and strategies he used in the war against Rome. Hannibal was born into one of the most 
preeminent military families in Carthage. He received extensive education and military training, 
accompanying his father Hamilcar to Spain at the age of nine, eventually serving as a faithful 
captain in the Carthaginian army. In 221, Hannibal was elected as general by his fellow soldiers.   
The education and experience he gained in his youth were critical to his military success. 
Understanding aspects of Hannibal’s youth, such as his formal Greek education, military 
                                              
 




training, and his experience in warfare before 218 are critical to better understanding the factors 
that motivated his strategic and tactical decisions in the Second Punic War. Hannibal’s Greek 
education and his father’s influence are two main topics examined here. Greek influences on 
Carthage, in general, and, more specifically, the influence of Greek warfare on the rest of the 
Mediterranean, are taken into account. Carthage’s military development before 221 is an 
essential factor to consider, including the influence of the Barcid family on military strategy. 
Hannibal’s military experience in Spain likely influenced his method. The historical figures of 
Xanthippus and Sosylus and their influence on Hannibal are a significant focus as well.  
 Hannibal’s Oath  
  The oath is the major episode of Hannibal’s youth. According to the tradition, Hamilcar 
made a sacrifice to Ba’al Hammon just before his expedition to Spain. Hannibal was only nine 
years old. The omens proved favorable, and Hamilcar asked Hannibal to join him on the dais. 
Hamilcar asked his son if he wanted to join the expedition to Spain. Hannibal agreed. His father 
made him swear an oath on that day that he would “never be a friend of the Romans.” This oath 
stayed with Hannibal for the rest of his life. He related the story to King Antiochus III, nearly 
forty-four years later, in order to gain his trust.73 This story emphasizes the influence Hannibal’s 
father had on his young son. The imposition of a life-long oath on a young child does not endear 
Hamilcar to the modern reader, but there is no reason to reject its authenticity. Roman 
historiography later condemns Hannibal’s actions based on the story of this oath, but there is a 
question of whether they understood its context properly.  
  Historians, such as Polybius, used this oath to further their claims that the Second Punic 
War was the result of Hamilcar Barca’s desire for revenge. Because of Hannibal’s war against 
                                              
 




Rome, his post-Carthaginian career, his connection to Antiochus, and a hostile Roman 
historiographical tradition, the ancient interpretation of the oath seems to have changed to an 
explanation based on enmity, 
  Before viewing Hannibal’s invasion of Italy as the fruit of this oath, it is essential to 
remember that he was an eager child at the time of the oath, likely desperate to join his father on 
an adventure. The fact that Hannibal eventually carried out a protracted war against Rome does 
make it easier to argue that the oath came from respect and then possibly grew into enmity.  
  After the war, Hannibal served as a government official at Carthage but was forced into 
exile by Roman intrigue. Hannibal’s post-Carthaginian career further serves Roman 
historiographical tradition. Rather than retiring quietly into exile, Hannibal traveled throughout 
the eastern Mediterranean, serving multiple Eastern monarchs. The most famous of these was 
Antiochus III of Syria. Hannibal served in Antiochus’ court as an advisor as the Seleucid 
monarch prepared to wage war against Rome. Roman historians blame Hannibal for inciting 
Antiochus to war, but Rome’s wars against Macedon and the Achaean League were a more 
pressing concern for the monarch. Antiochus was defeated by the Romans at Thermopylae in 
Greece in 191 and then at Magnesia in Anatolia in 190, effectively curtailing Seleucid ambition 
in Greece. Hannibal commanded a Seleucid fleet in this war but was defeated by Rhodes at 
Eurymedon in 190. Rhodes was an ally of Rome against the Seleucids. There is nothing in the 
record that gives reason for Antiochus’ giving Hannibal a command at sea rather than on land. 
Fearing arrest, Hannibal fled Antiochus’ court for Crete. He later found refuge in Bithynia and 
served King Prusias I until the Carthaginian was forced to commit suicide.  
  Hannibal’s post-Carthaginian career was framed by Roman historians to fit into the anti-




prosecuting a sixteen-year war in Italy appears motivated by enmity, especially since one of 
those kings invaded Greece. This perspective has become a hostile historiographical tradition 
which, ironically, is also motivated by enmity. Hannibal, prior to exile, attempted to faithfully 
serve his country in peace as he had in the war. The reforms he made during his time in office 
were mainly tax based in order to pay off the war indemnity. The wealthy Carthaginians that 
were being hurt financially by these reforms plotted with the Romans to hand over the retired 
general.74 His flight into exile was brought about by Rome’s subterfuge. If Antiochus had given 
command of his army to Hannibal, the Romans likely would have faced a monster of their own 
making invading Italy for the second time. As it was, Hannibal served various kings as an 
advisor and general. Rome, however reluctantly at first, continued to expand into the eastern 
Mediterranean. Rather than paint a picture of a warmongering Hannibal slinking from one 
Eastern despot to another, desperate to try his hand once more against the Romans, the image of 
an exile warning other nations of Rome’s growing shadow seems more appropriate. 
  The wording of the oath is critical. Polybius relates that Hannibal swore he would never 
be “the friend of Rome,” but later tradition records that he swore eternal enmity.75 Polybius’ 
wording probably relates to a diplomatic relationship. Hamilcar’s charge to his son meant that he 
should never allow Carthage to become subservient to Rome. This change in wording is part of a 
Roman historiographical tradition hostile to Hannibal. Placing the war guilt on Hannibal and 
Carthage justified Rome’s later vilification of the Punic general.   
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Hannibal before Saguntum 
  Hannibal’s Greek education served him well in Spain before he led his army into Italy 
and when he was still winning his spurs against the Iberian tribes. At the Tagus River in 220, 
Hannibal utilized a feigned retreat, then doubled back across a river to strike the enemy army 
with his cavalry. At the same time, he organized his elephant corps to trap enemy troops in the 
river. He abandoned his heavy baggage and siege equipment in Spain, making Hellenistic-style 
siege warfare impossible, and focused instead on superior mobility to force the Romans to battle. 
Much in the style of Alexander, Hannibal plunged into the heart of Italy in the hopes of bringing 
the Romans into a pitched battle. This strategy worked brilliantly at Cannae in 216. 
Hannibal Barca had considerable military training before his arrival in Italy. He spent two 
years campaigning in Spain to expand Carthage’s empire there. By 220, central and southern 
Spain were entirely under Carthage’s control thanks to Hannibal. The Punic commander had 
marched first against the Olcadi, in what is now La Mancha, taking their capital of Althaia by 
storm. Next, he captured Hermandica, now known as Salamanca, from the Vaccaei tribe. He then 
put down a revolt of the Carpetani tribe in the modern-day region of Toledo. After pacifying the 
population of Toledo, Polybius states that no people remained south of the Ebro River who could 
resist Hannibal or the might of Carthage.76  
A political analysis of Saguntum at the start of the Second Punic War is essential to 
understanding the war’s leading cause. Saguntum was an Iberian city that had formed some sort 
of treaty relationship with Rome. Scholars debate the date and nature of this alliance. Polybius 
assigns it to 220, but whether it was before or after 226, the year of the Ebro treaty, is the crux of 
the matter. The nature of the agreement is controversial as well. It cannot be regarded as a formal 
                                              
 




alliance because Rome did not go to Saguntum’s aid when Hannibal besieged it. Deditio in fidem 
is most likely, literally “to commit to oneself in good faith” but in reality “to surrender 
unconditionally.”77 The legality of the action is a moot point. Hannibal had to know that by 
attacking a city under Rome’s protection, despite its being within the political boundaries of 
Punic Spain, he was risking war with Rome.    
In the winter of 220-219, a group of Roman ambassadors arrived at Qart Hadasht to meet 
with Hannibal; this was the third embassy that Rome had sent to the Barcids in Spain. After the 
Romans allegedly had the pro-Punic leaders in the city murdered, Rome worried at the growing 
power of Carthaginian Spain and sent an embassy to Hannibal to remind him that Saguntum was 
under their protection.78  
  Every Barcid general had hosted a Roman delegation by this point. It was a sign not only 
that Rome took an interest in affairs in Spain but that the Barcids had gained recognition as the 
power brokers of Carthaginian politics. Despite each appointment and treaty being ratified by the 
Senate in Carthage, it became increasingly apparent to the international community that the 
Barcid family was in firm control of Carthage’s Spanish policy. 
  Hannibal’s treatment of the delegation reflects that attitude. The Roman ambassadors 
informed the Barcid general that Saguntum, a city situated south of the Ebro, had placed itself 
under Rome’s protection. As such, it was immune from harassment by Carthage’s armies. 
Hannibal scorned the ambassadors. According to Polybius, Hannibal was “totally unreasonable, 
instead of giving the true causes of his conduct, he took refuge in pretexts without foundation.”79 
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The Roman embassy traveled to Carthage itself to hold Hannibal responsible for his conduct. 
Hamilcar Barca had advised his son Hannibal to avoid conflict with Saguntum in order to avoid 
Rome’s interference in Spain. By 219, Hannibal had completed his father’s conquest of southern 
Spain by taking Saguntum, but it came at the cost of war with Rome. 
Hannibal’s Knowledge of Greek 
Hannibal’s formal Greek education shaped the foundation of his military knowledge. 
Carthage had fought in Sicily against the Greeks for hundreds of years. The cultural exchange 
that occurred between Carthage and the Greek cities in Sicily informed Carthage on Greek 
developments in warfare. Carthage also relied on Greek mercenaries to protect its maritime 
empire. These troops fought in the Greek manner and appointed their own captains, who were 
often Greek and were proficient in the Greek art of war. 
A famous example is the Spartan Xanthippus, who took command of Carthage’s army in 
255 and defeated a Roman invasion of North Africa in the First Punic War. Xanthippus trained 
the army in the use of disciplined phalanx formations and likely borrowed from the Spartan 
training regimen.80 Like Rome, Carthage was willing to learn from its enemies.  
The tradition of 4th c. military handbooks allowed educated Carthaginians to have access 
to the science of war.  Hamilcar Barca fought in Sicily for six years and saw firsthand Rome’s 
ability to persevere and overtake an enemy technologically. Carthage had been the preeminent 
sea power for centuries, but within a few decades, Rome had defeated it. Hamilcar returned to 
Carthage determined that his country would not fall behind in the techne of generalship. He 
raised each of his sons with a Greek education. From the fourth century onward, military 
                                              
 




manuals became increasingly sought after. There was no organized method of producing and 
distributing these manuals, however; so circulation was limited. Military manuals written by 
authors such as Aelian, Aeneas Tacticus, Asclepiodotus, and Onasander circulated in the 
Hellenic world. Histories, in general, were regarded as both political and military manuals as 
well. Thucydides, Xenophon, and especially Homer were essential reading for men of any 
standing.81 Hannibal was well-read and implemented Greek reforms in his army.  
The most significant Greek influence on Hannibal was the historian Sosylus. According 
to Cornelius Nepos, “Hannibal’s deeds of arms have been recorded by many writers, among 
them two men who were with him in camp and lived with him so long as fortune allowed, 
Silenus and Sosylus of Lacedaemon. Moreover, it was this Sosylus whom Hannibal employed as 
his teacher of Greek.”82 This Greek historian likely influenced Hannibal through advanced 
instruction in the Greek language. Despite being a Spartan and presumably a tactician, Sosylus 
likely taught first-rate Greek to Hannibal, which would have allowed the Punic leader to 
understand better the military handbooks and histories that were in circulation at the time. In all 
probability, Sosylus accompanied Hannibal for much of the Spanish campaign.   
  His influence on Hannibal was likely significant. Though there is little directly known 
about the relationship between Sosylus and Hannibal, the archetype example of mentor and 
student occurs throughout history. Though Hannibal was an adult by the time he set off for Italy, 
his tutor’s lessons should have influenced his perception of the Greek world. The texts that 
Sosylus used to teach Hannibal are unknown, but Hannibal would have focused on the available 
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military manuals, handbooks, and histories to improve his military knowledge. Sosylus also 
knew neo-Punic, which would have facilitated the transfer of knowledge. The possible ways that 
Sosylus could have affected or influenced Hannibal can only be guessed, but his emphasis on 
Greek is revealing. According to Cornelius Nepos, during his exile Hannibal dedicated some 
time to literature. Though no longer extant, Hannibal also wrote multiple books in Greek on 
various subjects including one addressed to the Rhodians on the acts of Cnaeus Manlius Vulso in 
Asia.83 This desire and ability to write later in life highlights Hannibal’s education in general and 
in Greek especially. Sosylus’ impact on Hannibal seems great, but this view could change with 
new evidence. 
Hannibal and Greek Intellectual Life  
 Hannibal’s Greek education presumably influenced his strategic and tactical perspective. 
An example is the envelopment tactic he used at the Battle of Cannae in 216. This formation was 
remarkably similar to the Greek formation at the Battle of Marathon in 490. At Cannae, 
according to Polybius, “after thus drawing up his whole army in a straight line, [Hannibal] took 
the central companies of the Spaniards and Celts and advanced with them in contact with these 
companies, but gradually falling off, to produce a crescent-shaped formation, the line of the 
flanking companies growing thinner as it was prolonged.”84 Herodotus describes a similar 
formation being used by Miltiades against the Persian invasion force. He says that “the Athenian 
formation at Marathon that day was something like this: their line was the same length as the 
Persian line, but their center was only a few rows deep. The center was the weakest part of the 
line, while each flank reinforced in great strength.”85 
                                              
 
83 Nepos, 23.13. 
84 Polyb., 3.11.3.  




  These two formations are remarkably similar in their description. The two battles 
mirrored one another as well. Herodotus recounts that “the barbarians eventually won the battle 
in the center of the line…[they] broke through and started chasing the Athenian center inland; 
meanwhile, the Athenians and Plataeans won at both flanks. Then the two flanks of the Athenian 
army joined forces, advanced against the Persian troops that had broken through in the middle, 
engaged them in battle, and defeated them.”86 Polybius states that the “Roman maniples easily 
penetrated the enemy’s front, however, following up the Celts and pressing on to the center, 
progressed so far that they now had the heavy-armed Africans on both of their flanks. The 
consequence was that the Romans were caught between the two divisions of the enemy.”87 
  The almost identical formations of both the Greek and the Carthaginian armies, as well as 
the subsequent tactical maneuvers, suggests that Hannibal utilized his knowledge of the Battle of 
Marathon to his own advantage. Hannibal most likely read about the tactics used at Marathon. 
Realizing he was in a similar situation, being vastly outnumbered by Roman forces, he used the 
momentum of Rome’s heavy infantry against them. 
  Lessons that Hannibal did not implement from his Hellenic predecessors included the 
emphasis on siegecraft. Philip II developed a corps of military engineers to be able to build siege 
equipment on site, which was invaluable to besieging fortified cities that Alexander encountered 
during his conquest of the Persian Empire, the emphasis being on catapults and siege towers. 
Hannibal did not share Alexander’s preference for siege warfare. Hannibal’s capture of 
Saguntum took nearly eight months before the city finally fell. For practical reasons, Hannibal 
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left his siege equipment and heavy baggage with his lieutenant Hanno before crossing the 
Pyrenees in 218. This suggests that his strategy focused less on siege warfare and more on the 
confrontation between armies.88 
  Daly describes Hellenistic armies as using the “cavalry as the arm of decision and the 
infantry as the platform of maneuver.”89 The Carthaginians took this strategy and emphasized it. 
The uneven terrain of Sicily made the infantry phalanx vulnerable and ineffective. They 
recognized that infantry needed to be more versatile in order to adapt to a changing battlefield 
more quickly. The Carthaginian military, therefore, emphasized cavalry as the decisive strategic 
unit in battle. The infantry served as the “platform of maneuver” for the Carthaginian cavalry and 
was remarkably successful against both Pyrrhus and the Sicilian Greek cities. This success 
continued to shape Carthaginian military tactics. The emphasis on cavalry led to the favored 
double envelopment strategy. Executing this maneuver was notoriously tricky for Greek and 
Hellenistic armies, but Carthage had more success because of their emphasis on superior cavalry.  
 Hannibal’s education in Classical Greek warfare invariably influenced his army 
composition, military tactics, and overall strategy. The balanced variety of troop types in his 
army shows that Hannibal had learned not to rely on the standard heavy infantry too much. The 
abandonment of his heavy equipment and camp followers, before he crossed the Pyrenees in 218, 
was an attempt to circumvent the supply issues that come with an army trying to cross a 
mountain range. He also tried to eliminate his army’s uniform and equipment issues by 
equipping his Libyan infantry with plundered Roman weapons after the Battle of Lake 
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Trasimene.90 His strategy concerning mercenaries is typical. Carthage had a history of relying on 
its citizen levies only in the most dire circumstances. Hannibal recruited his army from Libyan 
veterans, Spanish tribesmen, and Celtic auxiliaries. His cavalry were Numidians, and his light 
infantry and missiles were Balearic Islanders. He managed to keep this diverse army together for 
fifteen years while campaigning in Italy. The loyalty he was able to inspire in his troops is a 
crucial part of his military legend. Hannibal utilized his knowledge of Greek military history to 
construct a balanced fighting force out of disparate, albeit specialized, units. 
  In conclusion, Carthage represented one of the three major cultural powers in the western 
Mediterranean. The Punic culture had spread from the Levant to North Africa and then Spain. 
Greek culture dominated in southern Italy and Sicily while central and northern Italy were Latin. 
Sicily quickly became a battleground between the three cultures. Spain became the province of 
Carthage after its defeat in the First Punic War. It became a Carthaginian Empire with the 
Barcids serving as its colonial governors. There is not enough evidence to suggest that the 
Barcids ruled independent of Carthage though their position was vice-regal, as shown by their 
distribution of coinage, treaty-making with Rome, and the founding of cities. The home 
government in Carthage later ratified each of these actions. The actions that followed, such as 
war with Rome, were also supported by Carthage. The story of Hannibal’s oath should be 
accepted as true but with qualification. Contrary to tradition, it was not an oath originally based 
on enmity but on the issue of diplomatic friendship. 
 The Roman tradition preserved the memory of the Barcids to glorify Carthage’s eventual 
defeat. The political power the Barcids enjoyed was a result of their prowess as generals. The 
                                              
 




Barcids stand out in the history of Carthage’s generals because Hamilcar trained his sons in the 
Greek style of warfare. He had witnessed a Roman army defeated by Xanthippus, a mercenary 
skilled in Greek warfare who molded both its employer’s citizen levy and its mercenaries into a 
proper fighting force. In Spain, Hamilcar ensured that his sons received a Greek education while 
traveling with him on a campaign against the Iberian tribes. The campaign gave his sons 
experience applying Greek methods against an unconventional, guerrilla-style enemy . This 
blending of unorthodox and classical gave Hannibal a well-balanced knowledge of war. As an 
adult, Hannibal employed a Greek historian to tutor him. Greek military handbooks were 
probably translated, thus enhancing Hannibal’s ability to keep up with the latest methods. 
Hannibal’s campaign in Italy was likely modeled on Alexander the Great’s invasion of the 
Persian Empire.
 
CH 3: FROM SPAIN TO ITALY 
Saguntum was a small city one hundred miles south of the Ebro River. The Saguntines 
had diplomatic dealings with Rome as early as 231 and were under its nominal protection. There 
was no formal alliance or protectorate established, though it is likely that in order to receive 
protection, the Saguntines had to present Rome with a deditio in fidem, giving the Romans the 
right to dictate foreign and domestic policy in Saguntum.91  
Hannibal led his army to besiege Saguntum. It took eight long months before the city 
finally fell. The news arrived in Rome soon after the siege had begun, but both consular armies 
were elsewhere. When the city fell, the Roman Senate debated whether a war should be declared. 
Saguntum was of little value, but Roman prestige was at risk. The Senate appointed an embassy 
to travel to Carthage and demand satisfaction. Following the siege, Hannibal received news of a 
Roman embassy that had met with the Carthaginian Senate in response to the fall of Saguntum. 
The Romans had demanded that Hannibal be given over into their custody, or Carthage itself 
take responsibility for his actions. A war between Carthage and Rome was declared.  
Hannibal’s Strategy 
Hannibal’s march was the most critical decision of the campaign because it defined the 
strategic parameters of the war for Carthage. The choice to invade Italy was logical but risky. 
Carthage reduced its navy after the First Punic War. Rome’s fleet now guarded Italy’s coastline. 
North Africa, Sardinia, and Sicily, the previous areas of conflict, were not viable options for 
Hannibal. Sicily in particular, although in reach of Carthage’s remaining navy, presented a 
military quagmire the Punic general was not willing to repeat. The First Punic War had been 
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fought in the Carthaginian territory. Hannibal chose not to wait for Roman legions to arrive in 
Spain. Without an adequate navy, an overland march was the next option. 
 Strategy and logic aside, the fame of Hannibal’s march is owed to the Roman annalists 
who propagated its legendary status. Hannibal’s invasion shattered Rome’s sense of 
invulnerability and wounded the Roman psyche on a level that took decades to remedy. 
Hannibal’s fame was matched only by the hate it earned him.   
Alpine Route  
Uncertainty surrounds the question of what route the Carthaginian army took in 
Hannibal’s Alpine expedition. Over the last century, scholars have settled on three passes near 
Mont-Cenis, France: the Petit Mont-Cenis, the Col du Clapier, and the col du Savine-Coche. 
Most scholars in the twentieth century favored the col du Clapier. Marc de Lavis-Traffort, a 
humanist and doctor, spent years of his life hiking the Alps, texts in hand, applying what Lancel 
describes as a “cautious historico-philological approach.” His choice of the col du Savine-Coche 
led other scholars to reconsider their position.92  
Regardless of the exact route he took through the Alps, the Romans were caught 
unprepared. P. Cornelius Scipio’s march to Pisa reveals he expected Hannibal to come through 
the Pennine Alps at the Little St. Bernard Pass. Roman intelligence had not discovered the pass 
through the Mont-Cenis region.  
  Polybius states that Hannibal set off from Carthago Nova with ninety thousand infantry 
and twelve thousand cavalry. He then proceeded to cross the Ebro River and conquer numerous 
Spanish tribes, including the Ilurgetes, Bargusii, Aerenosii, and Andosini. Hannibal was able to 
advance to the foot of the Pyrenees Mountains before the end of the campaigning season. He 
                                              
 




then left his lieutenant Hanno in command of the territory north of the Ebro River. Hannibal 
gave Hanno ten thousand infantry and one thousand cavalry from his army. According to 
Polybius, Hannibal also sent an equal number of troops back to Spain to reinforce his brother 
Hasdrubal, not to be confused with his brother-in-law Hasdrubal the Fair. 
  Hannibal advanced through the Pyrenees and arrived at the Rhone River in August 218. 
According to Polybius, his army was reduced to fifty thousand infantry and nine thousand 
cavalry, a loss of forty-three thousand men. 93 Polybius accounts for twenty-two thousand 
missing soldiers, half placed under Hanno, the other half sent home to Spain, though it is 
difficult to believe that Hannibal had suffered twenty-one thousand casualties this early on.  
P. Cornelius Scipio was given a consular army and sent to Spain. He arrived by sea at the 
mouth of the Rhone at the same time as Hannibal. Scipio now had an important strategic choice 
to make. He could either turn his army about and give chase to Hannibal or continue marching to 
Spain. The former decision required him to abandon the plan to invade Spain and commit his 
forces to destroy Hannibal. There was a possibility that he might be able to confront Hannibal 
before he made it to Italy. Defeating Hannibal in Cisalpine Gaul could have brought the war to a 
quick conclusion.  
Scipio chose instead to leave the army in command of his brother Gnaeus and return to 
Italy by ship transport. This decision allowed him to raise another army to confront Hannibal in 
northern Italy and also allow the invasion force to continue to Spain. This turned out to be one of 
the most important strategic decisions made during the war because Scipio’s foresight allowed 
Rome to fight Carthage on two fronts.  
                                              
 




Hannibal in Italy 
Historians compare Hannibal’s crossing of the Alps to Caesar’s crossing of the Rubicon 
as a momentous historical event. Carthage was traditionally a naval power. Hannibal sent envoys 
to the Gallic tribes of the Po Valley in order to gain safe access through the mountains. Polybius 
describes Hannibal as a prudent commander who took great care to prepare for his campaign. 
Any other evaluation of Hannibal is preposterous, according to the Greek historian.94 Even with 
careful preparation, the crossing of the Alps was an enormous accomplishment. 
Hannibal’s Alpine march has been enshrined in legend since he arrived in Italy in 
November 218. Lancel compares this accomplishment to Alexander the Great’s march into the 
Persian Empire. He then goes on to describe it as an effort of “Herculean prowess.”95 This 
comparison to Hercules and Alexander does little to keep a grounded, historical perspective on 
Hannibal. Celtic bands had been traversing the Alpine passes since the 400s. Polybius’ 
description takes the wonder out of the feat but is overall a more balanced view. 
According to the inscription Hannibal himself left in Italy at Cape Lacinium, he reached 
Italy with only twenty thousand infantry and six thousand cavalry.96 Overall, Polybius’ casualty 
estimates for Hannibal’s army are questionable, despite the overall difficulty of the march itself. 
He likely overestimated Hannibal’s original numbers. Lancel numbers his army between sixty 
and seventy thousand men. No commander could have maintained a force with the number of 
casualties that Polybius gives. 
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The men who had survived the march were the remnants of one of the most massive 
armies the western Mediterranean had ever seen. The infantry consisted of twelve thousand 
African and eight thousand Spanish soldiers. Hannibal’s cavalry numbered at six thousand and 
consisted mainly of Numidian auxiliaries. He also had an elephant corps of about twenty-seven 
African forest elephants. None of these elephants survived through the winter of 218.  97  
By the time the Punic army arrived in Italy, it had suffered over fifty percent casualties. 
Hannibal’s diplomatic, strategic, and logistical decisions had placed his force in an untenable 
position before his army had even entered Italy. The Punic army lived off the land. Compared to 
Spain and Cisalpine Gaul, the fields of Italy were brimming with food. It was this expectation of 
Italian agriculture that Hannibal was relying on when his men made their descent into Italy. He 
rested his troops at Piedmont. The army’s numbers were skeletal in comparison to Polybius’ 
original estimation of over one hundred thousand men. Now there were fewer than thirty 
thousand, frozen and starving. 
Celtic support did not initially meet Hannibal’s standards either. Polybius and Livy each 
present a stereotypical view of the Celtic tribes. They were imposing men, courageous in battle, 
but greedy and easily corrupted by wealth. Their fickleness was their main vice to the Romans. 
Polybius describes how easily the Celtic peoples turned from one side to the other, even during 
battle.98 Hannibal’s army began making their way through the Po Valley and met with the same 
initial lukewarm reception.99 The Celts were waiting to see whether the Carthaginian army stood 
a chance against the Romans.  
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Hannibal responded like any general of the period. He besieged the capital of the Taurini, 
a local Celtic tribe, and killed everyone there that offered resistance. Lancel describes this act of 
terrorism as a necessity.100 Hannibal needed to spur the Gauls of the Po Valley to support his 
cause and give the Romans reason to fear his arrival. He was arguably successful in the latter. 
The Romans recalled their commander in Sicily, Ti. Sempronius Longus, to protect northern 
Italy against the Carthaginian threat. The former, however, is a thinly veiled attempt by Lancel to 
protect Hannibal’s image. The lack of supplies and the near-starved state of his men were 
motivation enough. Not every Celtic tribe was happy to see a large, foraging army in their 
territory. Their wealth and, more importantly, their harvest, were his for the taking, effectively 
bringing resources of the Celtic tribes of the Po Valley to Hannibal’s side. 
Carthage’s Army at the time of the Second Punic War 
The composition of the Carthaginian army was essential to Hannibal’s military success. 
The difference between the quality of the army that marched into Italy and the army that fought 
at Zama decided the battle and possibly the war. 
Carthage was a maritime trade empire that heavily relied on its naval fleet to control its 
territorial possessions. At its height, the Carthaginian navy at its full strength could field up to 
twohundred quinqueremes. On land, the Carthaginian military consisted of mercenaries recruited 
from its numerous territories. These soldiers were not Carthaginian but constituted a wide variety 
of different peoples brought under Carthaginian hegemony, including peoples from Sicily, 
Corsica, Sardinia, the Balearic Islands, Spain, and North Africa. Celts and Italians were also later 
recruited by Hannibal during his Italian campaign. Diversity was common in the Carthaginian 
                                              
 




military. Its armies eventually included Phoenician, Libyan, Libyophoenician, Numidian, Greek, 
Celtic, Iberian, Celtiberian, and Italian soldiers. Generals who commanded the army were 
exclusively from aristocratic Carthaginian stock.101  
The African infantry were Libyan subjects under Carthage’s control. These men were 
legendary for their endurance. Carthage had used them as their primary infantry unit throughout 
the history of their empire. Most of the soldiers that Hamilcar had led back from Sicily at the end 
of the First Punic War were Libyans. Each man carried “a few javelins, a dagger and a small 
round shield, the cetra.”102 These men quickly adapted once they arrived in Italy, however. 
Hannibal’s Libyan infantry stripped dead Romans of their armor and weapons after the Battle of 
Lake Trasimene. They fought alongside their Spanish and Celtic allies. 
Hannibal recruited eight thousand infantry from Carthage’s territories in Spain. Spanish 
tribesmen used a “short double-edged sword, equally useful for cut and thrust, and also a curved 
saber, the falcata.”103 Some used the cetra shield, but others adopted the long, oval shield favored 
by the Celtic infantry that Hannibal recruited after his Alpine crossing. The Celts proved an 
important infantry component as well. 
The rest of Hannibal’s foot soldiers consisted of mercenaries recruited from Carthaginian 
territory, including Spanish tribesmen who were not under Carthage’s control, such as the 
Celtiberi, as well as slingers from the Balearic Islands. Ligurian tribesmen enlisted from north-
western Italy.104 These mercenaries constituted a small contingent of the army. 
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Hannibal’s cavalry was primarily Numidian. They used similar weapons to those of their 
African counterparts in the infantry. Their small, round shields and javelins allowed them to 
mercilessly pursue fleeing units. This cavalry proved to be fast and effective at hit-and-run 
tactics. Hannibal relied on them to outmaneuver and defeat their Roman counterparts and to 
execute his great encirclement and flanking tactics. Numidia’s eventual defection to the Roman 
side proved critical to Hannibal’s defeat at Zama.  
History remembers Hannibal as a commander able to inspire exceptional loyalty in his 
troops, which is especially remarkable considering the diverse variety of elements in his army. 
Understanding the motivation of these men is critical to being able to appreciate their triumphs 
and tribulations fully.   
Hannibal, by all standards, was a gifted military commander. However, his troops did not 
follow him only because he was a great general. It also had to do with his family’s legacy. 
Primarily, though, Hannibal’s troops saw him as such an endearing commander because he 
provided them with wealth and plunder. These were necessities to a soldier in the ancient world.  
Carthage did not rely on an armed civilian militia, as the Romans did. The men who joined the 
Carthaginian armies were soldiers forged in the crucible of war; their loyalty to Hannibal was 
forged through the promise and delivery of wealth. They were not a professional army.  
Hannibal’s success in leadership is often unfairly attributed by scholars to him and his 
tactical brilliance alone. While he was an excellent general, credit is also due to his armies’ skill 
and willingness to fight at their absolute best for him, even in the face of adversity. Hannibal 
deserves much of the credit for being able to weld such a heterogeneous group of men into a 
formidable fighting force. The trials, triumphs, and tribulations of the Punic army that he led into 




Hannibal’s resolve but to the entire army’s esprit de corps that the Carthaginian was able to 
effectively campaign in Italy for fifteen years. 
Ticinus/ Ticinum 
 Hannibal and Scipio met at the River Ticinus near Pavia. Polybius describes it as a 
cavalry skirmish. The two sides engaged so quickly that Scipio’s skirmishers had no time to 
throw their javelins. The two lines of cavalry met head-on, eventually dismounting and engaging 
in hand-to-hand combat. Polybius makes a distinction between Hannibal’s bridled cavalry and 
his Numidian cavalry. Hannibal himself led the heavy cavalry while his light, Numidian cavalry 
flanked the Romans on both sides. Scipio’s skirmishers had retreated to the rear after failing to 
throw their javelins and were subsequently flanked by Hannibal’s Numidian cavalry. They were 
routed, and the Carthaginian cavalry was able to encircle and rout the Roman army. They 
managed to wound Scipio himself in the fight.105  
This first skirmish displays textbook tactical examples of Hannibal’s military leadership. 
The Numidian cavalry’s effectiveness at hit-and-run tactics countered the Roman heavy 
cavalry’s fighting style, which quickly devolved into infantry combat after an initial charge. 
Hannibal’s use of encirclement and flanking tactics depended on his superior cavalry. This 
advantage remained constant throughout Hannibal’s campaign in Italy. 
Trebia 
 After Publius’ defeat, the Celts in the Roman army defected to Hannibal’s side. They 
waited until dark and then slew the sentries and Roman soldiers near their camp. There were two 
                                              
 




thousand infantry and about two hundred cavalry. Hannibal welcomed them and sent them back 
to their towns to report their actions. His goal was to draw more Celtic tribes into the conflict.106 
 Publius retreated with his army to Placentia. Sempronius Longus, the other consul, had 
returned from Sicily and joined his forces with Publius. Polybius states that Publius advised 
Sempronius against engaging Hannibal in a decisive battle, his reasons being that an inactive 
winter allowed more time to train the army, restrict Hannibal’s ability to supply his forces, and 
provide an opportunity to win back Celtic support.107 Sempronius, however, was determined to 
engage the enemy before his term as consul ended. It is suspicious that this eerilyaccurate 
assessment comes from Scipio. Scholars must recall Polybius’ relationship with Scipio’s family. 
  This assessment, convenient and succinct, shows the two competing military strategies 
for defeating Hannibal in the Roman military. The cautious, containment approach favored by 
generals such as Publius, and later Fabius Maximus, was initially overruled by ambitious, 
overconfident generals eager to expunge an invader and win personal glory for themselves. 
Roman generals did not adopt the former strategy until the dictatorship of Fabius Maximus. 
Their failure to do so resulted in three of the most massive defeats in Roman military history in 
two years. 
 In late December 218, the Carthaginian and Roman armies fought a decisive battle at the 
river Trebia. Hannibal’s camp was west of the river while the Romans were on the east bank. 
The day before the battle, Hannibal placed his brother Mago with two thousand hand-picked 
troops, half infantry and half cavalry, in an ambush near a stream with steep, overgrown banks. 
On a set day, he ordered his Numidian cavalry across the river to skirmish with the Roman army. 
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Their objective was to draw the Romans across the river and fight the battle on the west bank. 
The light cavalry, adept at hit-and-run skirmishing, achieved their goal. Sempronius sent his 
entire cavalry corps against them and quickly ordered his skirmishers and infantry to follow suit. 
In a few hours, the entire Roman army had forded the river and deployed into line of battle. 
 Hannibal took his time deploying his forces. He sent eight thousand light infantry to 
support the cavalry skirmish and form a screen for his main force. He deployed his line only a 
mile outside of his camp. His men had the entire morning to eat and mentally prepare. The center 
consisted of a single line of close-order infantry that numbered twenty thousand. It consisted 
primarily of Hannibal’s Celtic allies flanked by Spanish and Libyan contingents. Hannibal 
consistently placed his Celtic infantry in areas where the highest casualties were likely. He used 
his allied infantry to hold the heavier Roman infantry in place while his superior cavalry flanked 
and encircled them. This strategy, while useful, angered his Celtic allies, who complained about 
their share in the plunder versus their casualties.  
 When the two armies finally met, the Roman cavalry and skirmishers were tired and 
heavily outnumbered. They spent most of their javelins in the fighting earlier in the day. As the 
two lines of infantry met, Hannibal’s skirmishers retired to the flanks to support his cavalry. The 
Spanish and Gallic heavy cavalry charged the exhausted Roman wings and routed them. Mago’s 
forces sprang from hiding and attacked the Roman rear. The Carthaginian center held long 
enough for the trap to close. The Roman infantry eventually broke through the center, but not 




seeing the battle was lost, marched north in formation, eventually crossing the Trebia and retiring 
at Placentia.108 
 The defeat at Trebia marked the first victory in Hannibal’s Italian campaign. The Senate 
was shocked by the defeat, but the war was far from over. Both sides spent the winter recovering 
and preparing for the next round of fighting. Rome could not allow an invader to remain on its 
soil without losing the respect of both its Celtic and Latin allies. The victory bolstered the 
Carthaginian army’s morale. It suffered considerable casualties during the winter, however, 
including all but one of the elephants. Friendly Celtic tribes maintained their supply lines, and 
the Carthaginians supplemented that by foraging and raiding. By the end of winter, though, 
Hannibal was lean on supplies, and another battle was necessary to keep his army’s momentum.  
Trasimene 
 In spring 217, Hannibal had two options to continue his Italian invasion. The Apennine 
Mountains divides the Italian peninsula in two. There were only a few places an army could 
cross, either east and down the Adriatic coast, or south then west into Etruria. The Senate placed 
one consular army in Ariminum and one in Arretium to oppose both possible threats. Caius 
Flaminius, the other consul elect, took office at Arretium rather than at the capital. Flaminius 
refused to preside over the consular rituals that year, which alienated many members of the 
Senate and provided a religious context for his failures as a commander back in Rome. 
 Hannibal crossed the mountains into Etruria then marched his army through the Arno 
swamps. In three days and nights, his army suffered numerous casualties from the unsuitable 
terrain. Many pack animals died, and Hannibal himself lost sight in one eye to ophthalmia. After 
a few days’ rest, Hannibal marched his army south past Arretium and into the Etrurian plains.  
                                              
 




Hannibal decided not to engage the Romans at Arretium in order to lure them into a battle 
he could design. This emphasis on maneuver and geography is a typical Hannibalic strategy. 
Marching south into the fertile plains let Hannibal resupply his exhausted forces while instilling 
terror in the countryside and further humiliating the Roman government. Flaminius, inflamed by 
Carthaginian pillaging, marched south from the safety of Arretium. The Roman army, comprised 
of farmer-soldiers and a landowning officer corps, were eager to avenge the devastation. 
 In June 217, Hannibal’s army came to Lake Trasimene. Hannibal pitched his camp at the 
far end of the pass in plain sight. The route past the lake led through a defile bordered by a line 
of hills. During the night, Hannibal formed his army into columns and marched them behind the 
hills. The African and Spanish infantry were positioned closest to the Carthaginian camp with 
the Celts forming the center and the cavalry on the farthest flank, ready to encircle the Romans. 
The next day, Flaminius marched into the pass oblivious of the danger. Polybius reports that a 
heavy mist from the lake obscured the soldiers’ vision.109 Flaminius marched nearly five 
kilometers to the far end of the pass before the trap was sprung.  
 In three hours, the Roman army that had marched into the defile perished. Flaminius died 
in battle. The Roman vanguard, about six thousand soldiers, managed to push through and 
escape, much like at Trebia, but were surrounded and captured in a few days. Hannibal’s Celtic 
allies suffered the highest casualties again. The Punic commander stripped the dead and re-
equipped his Libyan infantry with mail, a bronze helmet, and an oval shield. A few days later, 
Hannibal learned that Geminus, the other Roman consul, had sent his cavalry to reinforce 
Flaminius. Hannibal sent Maharbal to ambush this new cavalry threat. The Roman cavalry, 
                                              
 




around four thousand, were surprised and defeated. Hannibal enslaved the Romans among them 
but released their Latin allies. Rome’s army in the field now had mostly no cavalry. 110 Hannibal 
moved into central and southern Italy and remained there for the next decade. This was the last 
battle of the war in northern Italy until 207. 
 The Battle of Lake Trasimene was another military disaster for Rome. In six months, 
Hannibal had destroyed two consular armies and killed a consul in battle. The scale and 
execution of Hannibal’s ambushes and deceptive tactics had only increased as the war went on. 
Rome’s armies had never contended with a general so determined to fight on his terms. 
Hannibal’s careful choice of the battleground and emphasis on reconnaissance, ambush, and 
encirclement put Rome on the defensive.  
 The Senate responded to the crisis by electing a military dictator, a magistrate with the 
entire imperium, for six months or until the crisis was resolved, whichever came first. This man 
would determine Rome’s future strategy for defeating the invader. The assembled centuries of 
the People ratified Quintus Fabius Maximus. His first act as dictator was to blame Flaminius’ 
defeat on his refusal to adhere to the city’s religious rites. He ordered that the rituals be carried 
out and for consultation of the Sybilline Books, a series of prophecies regarding the city’s future . 
The Sybilline Books conveniently revealed that a return to traditional Roman virtues would save 
the city. Fabius was careful to observe all the rites and rituals of his office. Romans were wary of 
dictators who grew too fond of their power. 
Roman sources portray Hannibal as a treacherous enemy who engaged in unmanly tactics 
such as ambushes, deception, and bribery. The massive defeats at Trebia and Trasimene 
                                              
 




convinced Fabius Maximus that a change in strategy and tactics was necessary. Roman sources 
continued to vilify Hannibal for tactics that their commanders later adopted. Scipio Africanus’ 
campaigns in Spain and Africa, for example, are textbook Hannibalic wars. 
Plutarch describes Hannibal as a “skillful wrestler that brought into play all the arts and 
stratagems of war.”111 Fabius recognized Hannibal’s tactics and strategies as the mark of an 
experienced military commander and a Hellenistic military leader. Fabius’ strategy for defeating 
Hannibal was attrition. After Trasimene, Hannibal marched to the Adriatic coast and rested his 
army, plundering and pillaging along the way. He advanced down the coastal plain of eastern 
Italy, capturing Luceria, and then south-west towards Aecae. Here Hannibal encountered Fabius’ 
army, at least forty thousand men, and drew up his army to fight. Fabius, unlike previous Roman 
generals, had scouted ahead to determine the enemy’s location. He refused to give Hannibal 
battle on a field of his choosing, especially with such an inexperienced army. 
 Instead, Fabius followed Hannibal’s army as it marched through the Italian countryside. 
He refused to fight a pitched battle, choosing instead to ambush Carthaginian foraging parties 
and destroy animals and food where possible. This strategy of attrition became known to the 
Romans as “kicking the enemy in the stomach” and did not align with their martial culture.112 
Hannibal decided to invade Campania to provoke Fabius to battle. His army stormed the 
Falernian plain, looting, and burning, while Fabius watched from the mountains.  
 The Roman general’s patience had finally paid off. Winter was approaching. Hannibal 
needed to find a base to rest his army. Mountains encircle the Falernian plain, and only a few 
passes were suitable for Hannibal to march through. Fabius correctly guessed which pass the 
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Carthaginian would attempt to use and occupied it first. Hannibal was trapped. Unable to escape, 
and with the Romans refusing battle, Hannibal was at the mercy of the elements. A foraging 
army quickly strips the land of supply. The only option was to force a battle Hannibal had not 
planned out beforehand. The likelihood of casualties was high, and Hannibal could not afford to 
lose men. He could not raise a new army like the Romans. The solution was a deception of the 
highest form.  
 Hannibal gathered his army’s cattle and tied torches to the cattle’s horns. That night, his 
soldiers lit torches and drove the cattle onto the ridge to meet the Romans. Javelinmen deployed 
behind the cattle. When the Roman force holding the pass saw the mass of torches, they left their 
position to engage the enemy. They were confused to find the cattle, and they got a shower of 
javelins for their trouble. 
Meanwhile, Hannibal marched through the pass with his entire army and all their 
plunder, even managing to extricate his javelin men from their skirmish. Fabius, unsure of the 
circumstances, refused to engage in a night battle with his still inexperienced troops. Hannibal 
had made his escape.113 
 Fabius had been humiliated. His strategy went against the Roman military ethos, and 
without direct results, he could not convince the Senate to continue it after his term ended. For 
his trouble, the people nicknamed Fabius ‘Hannibal’s paedagogus,’ a slave that accompanied 
children to school, and he was given the cognomen ‘the Delayer’ for his refusal to act decisively. 
His strategy was abandoned. The Senate decided to raise the most massive army Rome had ever 
fielded to end the invasion once and for all. It was a grand vision that contrasted sharply with 
                                              
 




Fabius’ strategy. Rome’s military might was to be concentrated into one iron fist to smash 
Hannibal out of Italy. The defeat of this vast army would change the Roman military forever.
 
CH 4: BATTLE OF CANNAE  
The period 218-216 marks the high point of Hannibal’s Italian campaign. The trio of 
victories at Trebia, Trasimene, and Cannae devastated the Roman military and left Italy 
completely vulnerable. Cannae was the greatest of these victories. Hannibal defeated the most 
massive Roman army ever assembled. His success against the Romans’ homogenous manipular 
army merits praise, given the inherent difficulty in communication, coordination, and loyalty 
generally found in a mercenary force.  
 Fabius Maximus’ delaying tactics had given Rome six months to recover from the defeat 
at Lake Trasimene. Hannibal’s continued presence in Italy galled the Senate. In 216, the consuls 
conscripted armies of four legions each.114 These were in addition to Roman forces already 
deployed in Spain and Sicily. Another army marched north to face the rebellious tribes of 
Cisalpine Gaul. The extent of Rome’s human resources was on full display. Despite two 
significant defeats, Rome had enough men to meet the threat of invasion and send armies abroad. 
This theme continued throughout the war. Despite Hannibal’s undefeated streak of military 
victories, he was outnumbered and unable to meet Rome on every front. 
 In August, 216, the combined armies of consuls Caius Terentius Varro and Lucius 
Aemilius Paullus marched to meet Hannibal. Their army totaled eighty thousand infantry and six 
thousand cavalry. Hannibal fielded forty thousand infantry and ten thousand cavalry.115 The 
Punic general moved south from Gerunium in Apulia with the Roman army following close 
behind. The Romans scouted ahead carefully to prevent a Trasimene-like ambush. Despite their 
protests against Fabian tactics, Rome’s leaders had learned too well the cost of facing Hannibal 
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unprepared. Hannibal captured Cannae, a Roman supply depot, and camped in the hills south of 
the river Aufidus. The Roman army camped across the river and debated their next move.  
The consuls Varro and Paullus alternated command of the army daily. Sources disagree 
on the consuls’ preference for battle. Livy describes Varro as a demagogue, raised to power by 
the people, eager for battle, and Paullus as a supporter of Fabian tactics, though the likelihood of 
that being Paullus’ actual strategic alignment is minute given the support that Varro received 
from the Senate during that year’s consular elections. Pro-Scipionic sources, such as Polybius, 
preserved Paullus’ legacy, and Livy’s works were based on those accounts.116 Paullus advising 
against battle in Rome’s most significant defeat is too convenient for his reputation. Varro, on 
the other hand, was a new man vulnerable to propaganda. He survived the battle and became a 
scapegoat for the aristocracy and Livy’s historical tradition, which blamed disasters that befell 
the state on radical, populist politicians.117 The sense of impending defeat in Livy’s narrative is 
false. The Romans meant to decide the war at Cannae, and no army marches against an enemy 
expecting defeat.   
Varro advanced the army across the plain and camped on the bank of the Aufidus, only a 
few miles from the Carthaginian camp. The consuls were determined to fight. Their army was 
too close to the enemy to disengage safely. Rome’s citizen-soldiers were anxious to fight and 
avenge the destruction of the countryside. A tactical retreat would have led to a loss of morale 
and in-fighting among the Roman officer corps.118 The three armies were also quickly running 
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out of supplies. Hannibal had not established a supply base in Italy. The size of the Roman army 
made supplying it unsustainable.  
Lendon describes the conflict between Roman virtue and discipline as the underlying 
source of success of Rome’s armies during the middle Republic. Rome’s military philosophy 
was changing during this period. Through the Hellenization of the Roman aristocracy, generals 
were taught to be masters of trickery, general tactics, flanking maneuvers, and applied scientific 
knowledge. Rome’s citizen-soldiers, however, preferred quick campaigns that were decided by 
set-piece battles. Roman virtue was displayed through bravery in war and was the path to wealth 
for the soldier and to power for the politician. 119 Deception is a universal tactic practiced by all 
armies. Fabius Maximus went against the Roman military ethic by placing trickery and deception 
ahead of meeting the enemy in a pitched battle. Hannibal’s success accelerated this change.  
Only the Aufidus now stood between the Roman soldiers and their vengeance against 
Hannibal. Paullus divided the army and sent the smaller portion across the river. This second 
camp protected Roman foraging parties that crossed over to the Carthaginian bank. Hannibal 
responded by marching his army down from the hills and crossing to the Roman bank. He sent 
his Numidian light horse to harass the slaves gathering water for the camp and waited.  
On August 2, 216, Varro assembled his army and marched it across the Aufidus to rejoin 
the smaller Roman contingent. He deployed his infantry in a single line with the Roman cavalry 
on the right flank, the Latin and allied cavalry on the left. His infantry numbered fifty-five 
thousand heavy foot soldiers and fifteen thousand velites (skirmishers). Polybius states that 
Varro placed the maniples “closer together than was formerly the usage and making the depth of 
                                              
 




each many times exceed its front.”120 It is unclear how much deeper the Roman infantry was at 
Cannae, but the battle’s narrow front called for an altered formation. 
The Roman strategy was simple. In every battle, Rome’s infantry vanguard had managed 
to break through Hannibal’s center and escape capture. Nearly ten thousand men had escaped the 
terrible trap at Trasimene. With a deeper formation and narrow front, Varro and Paullus planned 
for the Roman center to smash through Hannibal’s lines, negating the Carthaginian superiority in 
cavalry as long as the flanks held long enough for the infantry to breakthrough. The river and 
hills prevented either army from flanking one another, and the Romans were confident their 
cavalry could hold against the Carthaginian cavalry for long enough. 
Hannibal accepted the Roman challenge to battle and quickly crossed the river and 
reformed his army. His cavalry mirrored the Romans on each flank. On his right, the Numidians 
were placed opposite the Latin allies, while on the left, Hannibal’s heavy cavalry opposed the 
Romans. He placed his infantry in the center with the Spanish and Gauls at the front and the 
Libyans on either side. Hannibal fought with his infantry in the center while Hasdrubal led the 
heavy cavalry, and Maharbal rode with the Numidians.  
The Carthaginian center advanced first. Hannibal led his Spanish and Gallic infantry 
forward, concealing his Libyan columns in a crescent-shaped formation. The two sides 
skirmished with their light infantry until Hasdrubal engaged with the Romans on the left-wing. 
Quickly engaging the cavalry was in the best interests of the Carthaginians because it meant less 
time that the center had to hold out against the Romans. Polybius describes the cavalry 
engagement as barbaric. The two sides charged, but once engaged, they dismounted and fought 
                                              
 




man to man. This is unusual for cavalry contests, which consisted mostly of wheeling evolutions, 
charges, and pursuits.121 The Romans were routed, but their escape was cut off by the river. The 
Carthaginian cavalry pursued them briefly, but Hasdrubal quickly rallied. This level of discipline 
was critical to executing the flanking and encircling tactics that Hannibal favored and would 
have been impossible without an experienced cavalry corps.  
 Meanwhile, the Romans and Celts clashed in the center. The convex, crescent formation 
of Hannibal’s army was steadily pushed back and inverted. The Celtic infantry performed 
admirably, steadily withdrawing without breaking rank; their performance flies in the face of the 
literary cliché of the fickle and quickly-tired barbarian. The Roman maniples pushed the Celts 
back until they exposed their flanks to the Libyan infantry. Suddenly, Hannibal had the Roman 
formation surrounded on three sides.122 The depth of their formation left the Romans unable to 
maneuver to meet this new threat.  
 On the right flank, Maharbal engaged the Latin allied cavalry. The Numidian skirmishing 
tactics kept the Latins occupied while the rest of the battle progressed. There was not the 
dismounted, hand-to-hand fighting that occurred on the left flank, keeping the allied cavalry out 
of the fighting. Hasdrubal, having gathered his soldiers from chasing down the Roman cavalry, 
wheeled his horses behind the Roman center and attacked the Latins as well.123 The Latin cavalry 
fled the field, and Hasdrubal allowed the Numidians to pursue them. He rallied his heavy cavalry 
again and charged into the Roman rear. The trap was sprung. 
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 The depth of rank that was supposed to be the Roman army’s strength became its 
undoing. The momentum that had carried the center into Hannibal’s trap now prevented the 
infantry from maneuvering to face the new dangers. The infantry could no longer maintain their 
formation. The fighting devolved into single combat or by companies. Surrounded, the Romans 
valiantly fought on. Paullus died in the fighting. Varro had fled earlier with the Latin cavalry. 
Still, the sheer number of Roman soldiers dragged the battle on for hours afterward. Carthaginian 
casualties were fifty-five hundred infantry and two hundred cavalry. Rome lost forty-five 
thousand infantry and twenty-seven hundred cavalry.124 The Romans were beaten, and their 
esteemed military reputation was shattered.  
Hannibal was now the master of Italy, and the Romans were terrified. A few days after 
Cannae, news reached the Senate that the Celts ambushed the army the Senate had sent to 
Cisalpine Gaul and destroyed it. Polybius says that “Fortune was taking part against them and 
meant to fill the cup to overflowing.” 125 Their armies in Spain and Sicily were struggling as well. 
Hannibal’s gamble to march into Italy was seemingly paying off.  
Cannae was the high water mark of Hannibal’s Italian campaign. A large part of southern 
Italy, including part of Samnium, defected to Hannibal.126 The greatest of these cities were 
Tarentum and Capua. The majority of the peoples that defected withdrew their support for Rome. 
Hannibal claimed he had come to free Italy from the Romans. The Latin and Greek cities in 
southern Italy took him up on his offer but were largely unwilling to take the fight back to Rome. 
Lack of a port city in Hannibal’s control created logistical supply problems. Repeated attacks 
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against Naples and Cumae were unsuccessful. Without the ability to resupply, the war in Italy 
was at a stalemate.  
Hannibal’s invasion force was the greatest threat to Rome’s Italian hegemony. His army, 
previously forced to forage and plunder to survive, now had an open road to their enemy’s 
capital. The critical point is Hannibal’s decision not to march on Rome after his triumph at 
Cannae and exploit the likelihood of a successful siege. Two significant assumptions distort 
modern historical views on the question. First, that Hannibal was not capable of mounting an 
effective siege of Rome; second, that the capture of Rome was not part of Hannibal’s campaign 
strategy.  
Hannibal was entirely capable of siege warfare. Livy gives multiple examples of cities 
the Carthaginian besieged before and after Cannae: Petilia, Nola, Acerrae, Casilinum, Cumae, 
and Tarentum. Large baggage trains were unnecessary for ancient siege warfare. Engineers built 
siege works and weapons from wood on site. Hannibal likely employed multiple “siege experts”: 
mercenary engineers hired to design and oversee construction of siege weapons. These 
professionals were readily available during the Hellenistic era, and it is unlikely that a student of 
Alexander the Great would have neglected siege warfare. Hannibal’s primary objective was 
likely to defeat Rome in Italy. Hannibal would have considered the possibility of besieging the 
city itself but he had made a reputation for himself by refusing to fight on the enemy’s terms. He 
specialized in drawing the enemy out into prearranged traps, not into long, costly sieges.     
Capturing Rome might not have even been part of Hannibal’s strategy. It comes from a 




soldiers that his goal was not the destruction of Rome itself.127 Modern authors such as Hallward, 
Delbrück, Picard, Bagnall, Caven, and others, support the theory that Hannibal’s strategy was to 
detach Rome from her Latin allies, isolating the city by building a coalition of Celtic tribes, Latin 
city-states, and southern Greek cities. 128 Capturing Rome could have accomplished all of 
Hannibal’s strategic and tactical objectives. Deconstructing the Roman confederacy, liberating 
the Latin and Greek cities, restoring Carthaginian hegemony, and even avenging his father’s 
defeat were all achievable by taking Rome. The answer to Hannibal’s passing up such an 
opportunity lies in the mundane world of logistics.     
Hannibal had not established a logistical base in Italy from which to supply his army 
before the battle of Cannae.129 The Roman army Hannibal encountered at the Rhone River in 218 
isolated him from being supplied by his “province” in southern Gaul or Spain. The Celtic tribes 
in northern Italy which had eased his way across the Alps could not be relied on as he 
campaigned into central and southern Italy. There was no city or base from which Hannibal 
could be resupplied from Spain or North Africa. Much of Hannibal’s strategy against different 
cities in Italy was an attempt to establish such a base. In 215, for example, Hannibal attempted to 
capture Cumae and use it as a naval base.  
Thus, Hannibal was dependent on the number of pack animals that his army could 
maintain. These animals determined the amount of food in supply and number of days the army 
could march. Casualties in the baggage train posed a threat to the entire army, which was never 
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more apparent than during the original two-week journey over the Alps.  Mountainous terrain 
could not supply the necessary amount of forage to maintain such a sizeable army. 
Lack of supplies forced the Carthaginian to make drastic strategic changes. In 217, 
Hannibal marched his army through Arno marshland for four days to reach adequate forage. The 
casualties in men and animals included the loss of Hannibal’s eye to ophthalmia. Before Cannae, 
Hannibal was almost wholly reliant on plunder and forage from the Roman countryside and was 
helpless against the hunger of his men.  
  Hannibal was a Hellenistic military leader. In the manner of Alexander, Hannibal planned 
to strike into the heartland of his enemy and defeat their armies in their own land. His strategy 
was to rely on forage and plunder to provision his army for a quick campaign. His plan, by 
ancient standards, was working correctly and peaked at Cannae. His spectacular victories made 
his forces the undisputed master of the Italian Peninsula. No force could stand against Hannibal 
in the field. After a defeat like Cannae, tradition dictated that Rome should come to terms.130 In 
the tradition of Alexander, Hannibal had performed brilliantly.  
The distance between the battlefield and Rome’s city walls was over two hundred miles, 
at least a two-week march for Hannibal. Rome’s standing army was vanquished, but its walls 
still stood. The Senate and the People of Rome prepared for a siege. Months, even years, would 
have been required to conquer the capital. Flouting long-standing practice, the Romans refused 
to seek terms after their crushing defeat at Cannae, the first step to negating Hannibal’s strategy. 
His war had turned from a lightning campaign to a long, drawn-out war of attrition. The lack of a 
logistical base in Italy turned the war’s momentum against Hannibal.  
                                              
 




The Revival of Fabius Maximus’ Plan 
 Rome’s response to its defeat at Cannae shocked the ancient world. Despite the Senate 
losing one-third of its members and the population suffering ten percent in casualties, they 
determined to continue the war. Also, the Senate refused to ransom the prisoners taken at Cannae 
and sent the survivors to Sicily to serve out the war in disgrace. Enfranchised slaves, criminals, 
debtors, and youths enlisted to form six new legions, equipped with foreign armor and weapons 
stripped from the temples, nearly twenty-five thousand strong.131 
 Roman tradition carried on in this time of crisis, and a dictator was elected, Marcu Junius 
Pera. The Senate prescribed religious duty as the path to reviving Rome’s fortunes and decreed 
that mourning for the dead was not to exceed thirty days. They consulted the Sibylline Books 
and performed human sacrifices in the Forum. Fabius Pictor was sent to Delphi to consult the 
Oracle of Apollo.132 The Senate wanted to steer the population from despair through dedication. 
These measures reassured the city and Rome’s allies that the war was far from over.  
  Hannibal spent the remainder of the 216 campaign season establishing his presence in 
southern Italy. Many states had defected to Hannibal, including parts of Apulia, Samnium, 
Bruttium, and Campania. The invading mercenary army now had supply bases to conduct their 
operations and a network of allies to defend from Rome. For the next decade, Hannibal was 
ensconced in the south, venturing into central Italy every year to fight Rome and its allies.  
  After 216, however, the nature of the Second Punic War changed. Rome was no longer 
interested in offering up armies as a sacrifice to Hannibal. Fabius Maximus’ plan was revived to 
defeat Hannibal through attrition. Rome’s superior manpower allowed its commanders to operate 
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in concert across multiple theaters. While Hannibal struggled to gain access to a port city, Rome 
began to systematically retake the cities that had defected. Hannibal was paralyzed, trying to 
protect all of his new allies at once. The Italian cities that rebelled often had to rely on their own 
forces. Without Rome as a political nexus, the loyalty of different cities was to themselves. Their 
lack of structure made them an ineffective coalition, which made reconquering them easier for 
the Romans. The Italian campaign became centered on controlling principal towns rather than 
pitched battles, and it dragged on for over a decade.  
 In 212, Hannibal captured the city of Tarentum through treachery. The citadel remained 
in Roman hands, however, and control of the port remained contested. Capua was besieged by 
Rome that same year, and in 211, the city fell. In 209, Tarentum was recovered by Rome, leaving 
Hannibal confined to the southernmost tip of Italy. The Punic commander’s only triumphs were 
at Herdonea in 212 and 210, where he defeated Roman forces of sixteen and thirteen thousand, 
respectively. He also managed to kill the consul Marcellus in an ambush in 208. These battlefield 
victories at Herdonea did nothing to change the war’s momentum. 
 Tarentum is an excellent example of the siege tactics successfully utilized by both sides. 
Its change of hands between Rome and Carthage highlights the role treachery and deception 
played in ancient sieges. Rome recaptured Tarentum by using the same tactics which later 
authors condemned in Hannibal’s case and which model Rome’s evolving standards for battle. 
 Siege warfare in the ancient world was a large, bloody business. Frontal assaults against 
walled settlements had high rates of failure and casualties. The two preferred methods to ending 
a siege were to starve out the defenders or gain access to the city through treachery. In 212, the 




political hostages from Tarentum for attempting to escape their confinement.133 A group of 
nobles decided to turn the city over to Hannibal in response. Their demands were political 
independence for their city without paying tribute or accepting a Punic garrison. These 
conditions were similar to those Hannibal granted the city of Capua after its defection. 
 To carry out the deceit, Hannibal provided Philomenus, one of the Tarentine nobles, with 
cattle from his baggage train to bring back to the city. Philomenus shared his gains with the 
sentries at the gate he consistently used to reenter the city. He used a specific whistle to 
announce his arrival, and the guards became used to this routine. Hannibal marched his army in 
secret to Tarentum. He divided his forces into three, leading an assault on the main gate himself 
while Philomenus led a thousand Libyans to his side gate. The other Tarentine noble conspirators 
plied the Roman commander with drinks that night then killed the sentries at both gates, allowing 
Hannibal and Philomenus to gain access to the city quickly.134 By dawn, Tarentum had fallen to 
Hannibal’s “treacherous” tactics. 
 The Roman recapture of Tarentum in 209 highlights Rome’s adoption of trickery and 
deception as viable military tactics. Fabius Maximus led an army against the city in what was to 
be his last campaign. Before the attack, Fabius learned that the sister of a Tarentine man in his 
army was in love with a commander in the city garrison. The consul ordered the man to defect to 
the enemy and make contact with the lovesick commander. He was persuaded by Fabius’ man to 
defect to Rome. When Fabius attacked the city, the commander and his men allowed the Roman 
soldiers to scale their section of the wall and helped the army enter Tarentum.135 This treachery 
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allowed Rome to retake the city with minimal casualties. Rather than chastising Fabius, Romans 
praised him for not directly assaulting the walls, a stark contrast to the censuring Fabius received 
for not fighting Hannibal head-on during his dictatorship. Tarentum shows the evolution of 
tactics and strategy that occurred in the Roman military during this period. 
In 207, the battle at the river Metaurus solidified Hannibal’s strategic predicament in 
Italy. Hannibal’s brother, Hasdrubal, led an army from Spain into northern Italy but was 
defeated. The only significant attempt made by Carthage to reinforce Hannibal in Italy during the 
war failed. Carthage raised multiple levies but chose to send them to Spain, Sicily, and Sardinia 
to protect their interests abroad.136 Hannibal, willingly or not, operated independently throughout 
the entire war. The decision by the Carthaginian government to not reinforce Hannibal was one 
of the significant factors that decided the war in Rome’s favor.  
Hasdrubal defended Spain while Hannibal invaded Italy. The two brothers had planned to 
reunite in Italy, but Roman success in Spain hindered their plan. Hasdrubal fought with varying 
success against the Romans for ten years. Eventually, he decided to join Hannibal despite the 
vulnerability this decision created for Carthage’s Spanish holdings. His army suffered a defeat at 
Baecula as they were attempting to depart, but their march over the Alps was much less painful 
than Hannibal’s had been years prior, likely because of the vast amounts of wealth Hasdrubal 
gifted to the native tribes. 137 Where Hannibal had smashed through the Alps like a Herculean 
legend, suffering horrific casualties, Hasdrubal took the more diplomatic approach.  
Hasdrubal arrived in Italy in the spring of 207. He marched through the Po valley to 
Placentia and besieged it. He sent riders to find his brother, but the Romans captured them. 
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Hasdrubal gave up the siege after a short time and began to march down the east coast of the 
peninsula until the armies of Salinator and the praetor Licinus intercepted him. The armies set up 
camp and eyed one another warily. Meanwhile, unknown to Hasdrubal, Caius Claudius Nero 
force-marched his army two hundred and fifty miles to reinforce his colleagues with eight 
thousand men,.138   
 Hasdrubal recognized from the separate trumpet fanfares in the consul’s camp that 
another commander had reinforced the enemy army. He decided against offering battle and 
attempted a night retreat. His forces became confused in the dark and began following the river 
Metaurus in an attempt to find a crossing. The Roman army pursued Hasdrubal in the dark and 
caught up to them the next morning as the Punic army was attempting to set up camp. 
  Both sides deployed their forces and waited. Hasdrubal stationed ten elephants in front of 
his main infantry line which was divided into two divisions, the Spanish on the right and the 
Gauls on the left. Hasdrubal occupied the high ground and placed his Gallic troops there to 
defend his camp. The Romans deployed in their traditional formation with an estimated forty 
thousand troops.139 
 The battle began when Hasdrubal led his men against the Roman left. The Spanish 
infantry held their own against the Romans, and the Gauls were secure in their defensive hilltop. 
Hasdrubal’s elephants disrupted the Roman center initially but quickly panicked. The battle was 
deadlocked until Nero, who commanded the right flank, marched his men behind the Roman 
formation and around the Punic right flank. The Spanish infantry crumbled at an attack from this 
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unexpected direction, and Hasdrubal’s army was routed as a result. Hannibal’s brother died, and 
his head was delivered to Hannibal in southern Italy as a final insult.140  
 The Battle of the Metaurus was the last significant engagement of the war in Italy. 
Unable to be reinforced but still unbeaten in battle, Hannibal crossed southern Italy like a caged 
beast. In 203, Rome’s success in Spain and Sicily provided it with a dangerous opportunity to 
invade Africa. Hannibal retreated to defend Carthage itself, and the war in Italy ended. 
Hannibal’s invasion of Italy had lasted over a decade. His victory at Cannae brought Rome to its 
knees. The Senate’s refusal to concede defeat left Hannibal without a strategic alternative . 
Hannibal was trapped, unable to bring Rome’s armies to a pitched battle and without the 
manpower to besiege their cities. The war had come full circle from the Spanish peninsula, over 
the Alps, through Italy, and finally to the heart of the Carthaginian Empire.
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CH 5: FIDES PUNICA  
Hannibal’s invasion of Italy during the Second Punic War was a catalyst for a mental 
shift in the Roman style of warfare. Not unlike World War I, which saw the horrors produced by 
mixing advanced technology with outdated tactics, the emphasis Hannibal placed on cunning and 
intelligence forced the Romans to fight a new type of war. Before Hannibal, the Romans had 
fought its traditional enemies in traditional ways. The Greek hoplite/phalanx style of warfare 
suited the Romans during their wars against the Etruscans, Samnites, and the Greeks themselves. 
This disciplined manner of fighting was effective in fighting the Celtic and Germanic tribes as 
well. Throughout the fourth and third centuries, the Roman military slowly moved away from the 
phalanx to the three-line maniple system they would employ until the Marian Reforms in 107 
and after. This gradual shift focused on troop deployment, weapons, and utilization of cavalry. 
The manner of fighting, however, remained largely the same. A conflict between two armies 
usually lasted a day or two. The opposing lines would clash, using arrows and spears and slings, 
pushing and shoving with shields until eventually one line broke and fled, leaving the victors in 
possession of the field.  
Hannibal and Deception 
Hannibal’s emphasis on deceit, military trickiness, and strategies, however, forced the 
Romans to use deceit and military tricks as an element of strategy as well. Hannibal destroyed 
three armies before the Romans finally conceded that subduing their enemy would require a new 
method. Faced with an unpredictable, wily enemy, the Romans had to become tricksters 
themselves. This transformation took time and was incredibly unpopular with the Roman people. 
The two most successful Roman generals, Fabius Maximus and Scipio Africanus, realized that 
survival was more important than their Roman pride. It is thanks to these two generals' 




Deceit, as an element of strategy, is an essential component of warfare. The Roman 
reluctance to fully adopt deceit into Rome’s military repertoire is an outlier in the ancient world. 
Even the Greeks, who prided themselves on their hoplite warfare had, Odysseus and Metis. 
Metis, in particular, was seen by the Greeks, especially the Athenians, as a quality to be 
emulated. Originally a mythical goddess, metis connoted “magical cunning” and was used to 
describe the actions of characters like Prometheus. Hannibal was to Rome as Odysseus was to 
the Cyclops, using intelligent trickiness to turn the Cyclops’ own strength and size against it. 
Hannibal’s stratagems followed in the Homeric tradition. By condemning Hannibal’s campaign 
decisions as fides Punica, the Romans exposed themselves as being out of touch. 
It was not until Rome embraced stratagems and military tricks that they managed to stem 
Hannibal’s onslaught. Rome’s cultural expectations for how their military conducted itself did 
not change overnight. It took multiple defeats, desperate people, and new leaders willing to 
adapt. Fabius Maximus recognized that Rome could not continue to fight Hannibal in its 
conventional manner. It was not until Publius Cornelius Scipio (Africanus) assumed command in 
Spain that a Roman general was willing to fight the Barcids in their own game. By putting the 
Romans so thoroughly in a corner, Hannibal planted the seeds of his own destruction. He was so 
successful that the next Roman military generation had to emulate him. Scipio became his best 
student: a Roman Hannibal. He used the stratagems that had defeated Italy’s most exceptional 
and turned it against Hannibal’s allies in Spain. At Zama, Scipio chose the terrain, ensured 
cavalry superiority, and nullified Hannibal’s war elephants. 
The concept of fides Punica, however, goes back further than Hannibal, Fabius, and 
Scipio. Punic cultural stereotypes concerning deception and treachery were used by later Roman 




Romans decried what they perceived as a moral deterioration of their society. Their essays 
looked back to when Rome, in their eyes, stood faithful and loyal to its allies in defense of the 
brooding Punic menace across the sea.   
Recent scholarship is revising the idea that a consistent negative Punic stereotype existed 
in the Latin, Greek, or Punic cultural spheres before the destruction of Carthage in 146.141 The 
revision follows in a similar vein to the increase in academic interest regarding the Punic world 
generally. This stereotype coalesced into a specific Roman prejudice.  
 In the Greek world, Phoenicians (and by extension their Punic descendants) received 
recognition for their mercantile and seafaring prowess. Homer calls them “noble.” Herodotus 
praises their practice of silent barter with Iberian natives.142 Aristotle praises their government, 
and these praises are later echoed by Polybius, though the latter does place Carthage’s 
government second to Rome because of accusations of corrupt electoral processes.143 The 
charges he levels against Carthage read like projections of the issues Roman politics were 
experiencing at the time of his writing.  
That is not to say that Greek sources are all positive and pro-Punic. Aristotle did criticize 
the practice of letting a citizen hold more than one office at once. There were also references to 
Punic avarice and trickery concerning only mercantile activities. Herodotus, however, praises the 
loyalty of the Phoenicians, specifically in regard to the Carthaginian cousins.144 On the whole, 
                                              
 
141 Erich S. Gruen, Rethinking the Other in Antiquity (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2010), 116. 
142 Hdt. 4.196.  
143 Aristotle Pol. 1272b, 1273b, 1273a. 




the Phoenicians are treated fairly by Greek sources. It is only in later Roman authors, or Greeks 
patronized by Romans, that the oxymoron of Punic loyalty forms.145  
 There is no foundation for a decidedly negative Punic stereotype in Greek literature. 
There are also no extant sources written during the Punic Wars themselves, Roman or otherwise. 
To be clear, the stereotype referenced in this paper includes public accusations of disloyalty, 
treachery, and deception in the diplomatic sense. Polybius describes in detail the Roman 
embassy to Carthage after Hannibal’s siege of Saguntum with both sides arguing over which 
state had broken the peace.146 The sacredness of the treaties is apparent. Polybius acknowledges 
the sanctity of Punic treaties by having the Carthaginians argue to uphold the terms. He then 
attributes the leading cause of the war to the Roman seizure of Sardinia, which he judges as 
unjust. As Gruen states, “charges of treaty violations, a regular feature of rationales for war, are 
quite different from accusations of an ethnic propensity for perfidy.147” Accusations of treaty-
breaking were not the same thing as an attack on national character. 
This chapter focuses on deception as a vital part of the strategy employed during the 
Second Punic War by both sides. During the Second Punic War, the Romans learned to embrace 
stratagems. It is essential to discuss the origin of the idea about fides Punica before going further 
because the deception, trickery, deceit, and stratagems that both sides employ are not an offshoot 
of a treacherous Punic national character. Hannibal employed deception as a tool of military 
strategy because he was an elite, trained general. His Roman rivals (Fabius and Scipio) embraced 
these military tricks to defeat a military threat, not an ideological one.  
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  The phrase Punica fides occurs in explicit form no earlier than Sallust among extant 
texts. The stereotype characterizing Carthaginians as oathbreakers began after the destruction of 
Carthage in 146. Roman opinion had divided over whether to go to war a third time with their 
Punic rivals.148 International opinion had divided as well, especially after Rome destroyed the 
city.149 Roman authors often regarded the destruction of Carthage as the start of the moral 
decline of the Roman people and used the extinction of the Carthaginian people as an 
opportunity to mold opinion about the vanquished in order to put Rome in a positive light. 
Two authors, Cicero and Livy, are the extant authors whose work most prominently touts 
the idea of fides Punica. Cicero inconsistently charges Carthaginians with lying, deceiving, and 
treaty-breaking, a tradition carried down from their Phoenician forefathers.150 In one speech, 
Cicero judges their entire race to be liars, based only on their lineage; in another, it is their 
livelihood as seafaring traders that condemns them to a life of dishonesty.151 His inconsistency 
and distance make him an unreliable source on Punic national character. His conflicting 
perspective on Hannibal himself furthers his viewpoint. In his De Officiis, he compares the Punic 
general with his rival Fabius Maximus, positively measuring them as being equal in cunning.152 
Cunning being positively attributed to a Roman denotes the Romans’ acceptance of deceit as a 
strategic element. Acceptance of deceit also appears in Livy’s work, though he describes 
Hannibal’s treachery as “beyond Punic.”153  
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Because treaties of the time were so deeply intertwined with piety, Hannibal’s treaty with 
Philip V of Macedon contradicts Roman accusations of his impiety. Hannibal ratified the treaty 
with an oath taken before the Greek and Phoenician gods as witnesses to the agreement.154 
Hannibal demonstrates his piety amply. After crossing the Rhone, Hannibal gave a benediction 
and prayed to the gods on behalf of his army.155 Livy tells us how Hannibal went to Gades to 
fulfill a vow after his victory at Saguntum, where he took on new vows to ensure the success of 
his Italian expedition.156 At the Po River, Hannibal called on Jupiter, the same deity addressed in 
his childhood oath, to witness the promises made to his soldiers.157 Hannibal held the temple of 
Juno Lacinia in such high esteem that he frequently headquartered near it while in Italy. This 
temple is also where he set up the bronze tablet inscribed with his achievements.158  
Other Roman authors did not share the same perspective on Punic character. In Virgil’s 
Aeneid, it is the eventual founder of Rome that is charged with treachery when he leaves his 
lover Dido, queen of Carthage, and absconds to Italy. The dishonored queen curses Aeneas and 
his descendants before committing suicide. That an author writing during the principate of 
Augustus charges his and Rome’s ancestor with crimes of that nature against a Punic character 
indicates that Roman culture did not have a deep prejudice against their Carthaginian neighbors. 
Gruen states the new argument succinctly: 
In the age of the Punic Wars, the Romans did not require a construct of Carthaginians as 
barbarous, wicked, and faithless to bolster their self-esteem or exhibit their superiority. 
The concept of Punica fides in Roman thinking emerged late, after the destruction of 
Carthage, and the phrase itself later still (at least in our extant sources). Insofar as it had 
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value for Roman self-perception, this may have come once Carthage was wiped off the 
map, and Romans felt a need to explain why such an act made sense.  159  
 
  Cannae was the catalyst for the Roman military elite adopting deceit as an element of 
strategy. After the titanic defeat of Hannibal, Fabius Maximus was seen as a man of forethought 
rather than cowardice. He proposed multiple measures to restore order to the city, including 
outlawing public mourning. Austerity brought Rome back to its senses. For the next seven years, 
Fabius practiced his war of attrition against Hannibal, refusing to fight him head-on. His cat and 
mouse strategy finally paid off in 209 when, by employing treachery, he retook Tarentum, 
Hannibal’s stronghold in southern Italy. 
Fabius Maximus, the Romans, and Deception 
  Fabius’ strategy was twofold. First, he gave orders to the garrison at Rhegium to overrun 
Bruttium and take Caulonia, both of which were under Hannibal’s protection. Hannibal rushed 
out of his fortress to defend his Latin allies. As discussed in the previous chapter, Livy reports 
that a captain of the guard was in love with the sister of an officer in Fabius’ army. The Roman 
commander used this relationship to his advantage and bribed the commander with the woman’s 
hand in marriage. While Hannibal was chasing the Rhegine garrison across the countryside, 
Fabius besieged Tarentum. The city fell within five days thanks to the turncoat who allowed 
Fabius’ forces to scale his section of the wall unchallenged. Upon losing the city, Hannibal 
commented, "It seems that the Romans have found their own Hannibal, for we have lost 
Tarentum in the same way that we took it.160” 
The taking of Tarentum through treachery crystallizes the change in Roman military 
thinking. It was the clearest expression of Fabius’ tactical philosophy. Roman citizens could 
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finally see the fruit of the Delayer’s work after years of stalking Hannibal through the Italian 
countryside and striking out at foragers and pickets. Political infighting had seen Fabius removed 
from command once already, with the disastrous result at Cannae to show for it. Hannibal had 
narrowly escaped Fabius once on the Falernian plains. This time, Fabius took his strategy to its 
logical end and fought only when sure of Hannibal’s absence, capturing a critical supply base as 
a result. Hannibal’s praise and comparison to his own way of thinking reveals how much the 
Roman high command changed in order to defeat their enemy. 
 These tactics, including avoiding pitched battles, targeting supply lines, maintaining the 
high ground, and ambushing foraging patrols, were part of a broader strategy to wear Hannibal’s 
army down through attrition. Fabius’ willingness to engage in tactics widely considered 
unbecoming of a Roman was propagated by the next generation of military commanders. One in 
particular, Scipio Africanus, the eventual conqueror of North Africa, had Fabius Cunctator to 
thank. Over a thousand years later, the American general George Washington became known as 
the “American Fabius” by adopting these same tactics to defeat the British army in the American 
War for Independence.   
Scipio in Spain – The Roman Hannibal 
Spain was the pivotal battlefield of the Second Punic War. It is important to remember 
that Hannibal would not have been able to prosecute the war in Italy without the material and 
human resources he acquired in Spain. After the war, the wealth that Carthage had gained 
allowed it to pay off its war indemnity to Rome quickly and fueled an economic revitalization. 
The Roman success in Spain prevented Hannibal from being adequately reinforced, and the 
Punic defeat in Spain also created an opportunity for Rome to invade North Africa. Hannibal’s 





  The quality of Carthage’s generals was low, excluding Hamilcar and his sons, so  
Hannibal’s success gained in Italy was not matched in the battles that took place in Spain. 
Hasdrubal was like neither his father nor his brother. This lack of leadership was the main 
disadvantage that the Carthaginians had to contend with throughout the war. Their reliance on 
mercenaries and indigenous and other allies also proved costly. In 216, the Tartessii tribe in 
southern Spain rose in rebellion against their Carthaginian rulers. In 214, Hasdrubal returned to 
North Africa to put down a Numidian revolt as well. These disruptions in the Carthaginian 
heartland led to a division of its forces, halted any countermeasures against Rome, and prevented 
the Carthaginians from adequately supporting Hannibal’s army in Italy. 
  The Romans were mostly victorious in Spain because Scipio Africanus adapted 
Hannibalic tactics. By 212 B.C., Saguntum was recaptured. Besides one disastrous defeat in 211, 
the Roman army steadily pushed back Punic expansion in Spain. In 209, Scipio conquered the 
Punic capital in Spain. The next year, Carthaginian influence in Spain ended after their defeat at 
the Battle of Ilipa. There, Scipio won by using a double pincer maneuver taken straight from 
Hannibal. At Ilipa, Scipio also met the Numidian king Massinissa. Rome was then able to lead 
an expedition to North Africa, forcing Hannibal to return from his campaign.161 
  In 215, Hasdrubal had quelled the trouble in central Spain. His brother Mago arrived with 
over ten thousand reinforcements, including twenty elephants. The two armies clashed outside 
the town of Hibera. News of Hannibal’s victory at Cannae had already reached Spain by then. 
Hasdrubal attempted to repeat the victorious tactics his brother used at Cannae. He placed his 
Spanish troops in the center, with African infantry flanking each side. This strategy exemplifies 
                                              
 




the similar military training the two Punic generals underwent beneath their father’s tutelage. 
There was a distinct difference between Hannibal and his younger brother Mago in martial skills, 
however. The type of encirclement tactic used at Cannae took precision, skill, and a bit of luck to 
pull off. The Roman infantry pushed back the Carthaginian center as planned but then broke 
through and attacked each flank at the same time. Hasdrubal’s cavalry had already fled. Mago 
soon followed in another bitter defeat.162    
This second defeat put a stop to any plans to reinforce Hannibal. Despite his elder 
brother’s repeated entreaties, as well as the stringent orders of the Senate, Hasdrubal was fighting 
for his life in the heartland of Carthaginian Spain. The sources are mixed about what took place 
over the next three years. Carthage was busy attempting to maintain its tenuous alliance network 
with the numerous tribes in southern Spain. The Scipio brothers solidified their hold in northern 
Spain while dealing with financial troubles regarding the army’s payment. In 212, the Roman 
army managed to recapture Saguntum and restore its independence from Carthage.163 This defeat 
was both a military and a symbolic defeat for Carthage.  
  211 was a notable reversal for the Romans in Spain. The Roman army, victorious there 
for the last eight years, was almost annihilated. Hasdrubal and his brother Mago each led a 
Carthaginian force that year against separate targets. The Scipio brothers, confident in their new 
Celtiberian allies, split their forces as well. Gnaeus Scipio chose to face Hasdrubal, his old 
enemy, while the newly arrived Publius went to attack Mago. Disaster struck when Hasdrubal 
bribed Gnaeus’ Celtiberian tribesmen to abandon the Romans in enemy territory. The Romans 
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beat a hasty retreat. Gnaeus chose to die fighting rather than surrender. His brother Publius had 
been slain in battle four weeks earlier. Roman survivors managed to form and hold a defensive 
line along the Ebro River, but both Scipios were dead.164  
  The Roman Senate responded quickly. In 210, Gaius Claudius Nero went to reinforce the 
Ebro in Spain with twelve thousand foot soldiers and one thousand cavalry. Later that year, 
another Publius Cornelius Scipio (hereafter referred to as Scipio or Scipio Africanus) was elected 
to replace Nero in Spain. He was the eldest son of the recently killed Publius Scipio. He arrived 
in Spain with eleven thousand troops.165 Roman strength in Spain was completely restored. 
Quick action and communication by the Roman Senate and its commanders had saved Rome’s 
position in the region. 
Scipio accepted the position in Spain to avenge his family. His father and uncle were 
killed in 211 by Hasdrubal at the Battle of the Upper Baetis (mentioned above). He had also 
fought against Hannibal in Italy at the Ticinus and Cannae.166 These early experiences were 
invaluable later on in Spain. Scipio had learned much from seeing the Romans defeated in Italy. 
When he arrived in Spain, the Carthaginians witnessed Hannibalic tactics firsthand from their 
young Roman enemy. 
  In 209, Scipio marched to Nova Carthago, the capital of Punic Spain. Hasdrubal, Mago, 
and Hasdrubal Gisco had spread their forces throughout the territory. None of their armies were 
within ten days' march of the capital. In a few days, Scipio managed to take the capital.167 This 
defeat was catastrophic for the Carthaginians. Scipio released the Spanish tribesmen that had 
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been held in Cartagena as political hostages by the Carthaginians. Their return led to a storm of 
defections to the Roman side. Northeastern Spain was in Roman hands. Central Spain and the 
principal tribes south of the Ebro were up in arms.  
Cartagena is the first significant example of Scipio’s use of trickery, deception, and 
treachery (Hannibalic tactics). The city was on a peninsula connected by a narrow isthmus. To 
the north, the city was protected by a lagoon that fed into a canal to the west of the city; to the 
south, the bay protected the confident defenders from attack. These features guaranteed that any 
assault on the city would be a costly endeavor.  
One thousand Carthaginian troops and two thousand citizen militia were garrisoned 
inside the city when Scipio arrived with over twenty-five thousand men. There were only around 
ten days before reinforcements arrived to rescue the city, so Scipio had to act fast. Before he 
could strike, however, the commander Mago sent out his militia to attack the Roman camp. The 
fight was long and bloody. The defenders were eventually driven back to the walls with the 
Romans in pursuit. Scipio ordered a full assault, but the defenders drove the Romans back. The 
next day, a Roman fleet appeared and assaulted the seaward walls. Again they were thrown back, 
but only just.168  
Finally, Scipio took a page from Hannibal’s playbook and utilized knowledge of the 
terrain. Before his campaign began, Scipio had consulted with fishers who knew the waters near 
Cartagena well. According to them, the lagoon that protected the northern walls of the city was 
fordable during low tide. Scipio brought a few fishermen to guide his army just in case. Now, 
with the walls standing after two direct assaults, Scipio made use of this information. He picked 
                                              
 




five hundred soldiers to lead a delayed assault on the north wall. Mago had positioned his men 
elsewhere. The secret detachment met with no opposition and quickly captured the walls. They 
helped Scipio’s main force capture the main gate. Within hours, the Carthaginian capital in Spain 
had fallen.169  
Scipio’s intelligence gathering, use of guides, feint assaults, and surprise marches were 
all deceptive tactics showcasing the change in Roman thinking. He could not resist conventional 
Roman thinking in assaulting the walls after breaking the sally, however. Once he had met with 
stiff resistance, he did not continue trying the same tactic over again. This is a stark difference 
from Hannibal after his lightning campaign from 218-216, when he did not achieve the expected 
surrender from the Romans and chose to remain in Italy. In that regard, the reluctant student 
eventually surpassed his mentor and enemy. 
 When Scipio marched south again in 208, Hasdrubal faced him alone. The two other 
commanders were occupied throughout the region, putting down rebellions. The Battle of 
Baecula, as it became known, was a severe defeat for Hasdrubal. Scipio’s forces  outmaneuvered 
and surprised the Carthaginian forces while they were trying to defend a hilltop.170 Hasdrubal 
retreated south, where he rejoined Mago and Hasdrubal Gisco. He soon decided to take his army 
and finally march for Italy. His departure left the other two Carthaginian commanders to deal 
with the victorious Roman commander steadily pushing them further south. 
 Africanus continued to pressure the Carthaginian front. In 206, Scipio led the Roman 
army south in an attempt to bring about a decisive battle. Hasdrubal Gisco obliged him. The 
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Battle of Ilipa, as it came to be known, is famous because it is the first time the Roman infantry 
organized itself into cohorts.171 New tactics allowed for incredible mobility and maneuverability. 
During the battle, the Roman army went from line formation to marching columns and back 
again as it charged the Carthaginian center. The quick maneuver allowed the entire Roman 
column to attack at once. Scipio also utilized a double pincer that mirrored Hannibal’s own at 
Cannae.172 The result was a terrific victory for Scipio. Hasdrubal Gisco fled to North Africa, his 
army destroyed.  
Scipio’s double pincer maneuver at Ilipa highlights how much the Roman commander 
had learned from watching Hannibal beat his countrymen in Italy. He spent multiple days before 
the battle deploying his soldiers in a consistent formation (Romans in the center, auxiliaries on 
the wings). Scipio lulled the Carthaginians into a false sense of security. Then he switched these 
units and marched on the Punic camp early in the morning to prevent them from eating breakfast. 
His Roman veterans now on the wings, Scipio deployed a curved battle line. It was too late for 
Hasdrubal to redeploy his forces once he realized the trick. Their flanks routed while the Roman 
center was held back by Scipio, keeping the Punic middle from being redirected elsewhere. The 
result was a complete envelopment of the Punic army.173 
This deceptive deployment, including the intentional timing of bringing the Punic army 
to battle, was designed to give Scipio’s army every advantage. Ilipa was not Cannae, where the 
Romans relied on their brute force and numbers. Scipio was in hostile territory, attempting to 
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win over allies and defeat multiple enemy armies, and he used similar tactics and strategies to 
Hannibal because the two commanders were in the same military situation.  
Spain was wholly in Roman control by the end of 206. Scipio consolidated his hold over 
the Iberians and Celtiberian tribesmen. He sailed to Africa, to the court of Syphax of Numidia, 
where he impressed both the king and Hasdrubal Gisco (there to enlist Numidian aid against 
Rome).174 Although he eventually failed to prevent Carthage and Numidia from siding against 
him, Scipio did manage to enlist the aid of a young Numidian nobleman, Masinissa, whom 
Scipio had defeated at Ilipa. Masinissa had returned home and fought a guerrilla war for his 
father’s crown but was defeated multiple times, and yet always evaded capture. When Scipio 
invaded Africa in 204, Masinissa and his rebels joined him, with the promise of the Numidian 
crown for his assistance. Scipio needed Masinissa’s cavalry to counter Syphax. The Roman 
general had seen the effect of superior cavalry at Cannae.175  
Scipio and Hannibal faced off in 203 at the Battle of Zama, which will be discussed 
further in the next chapter. Scipio was victorious and was the first Roman general to earn the 
agnomen of the country he conquered (Africanus). The Second Punic War ended shortly 
afterward, but the focus here is to highlight how Scipio learned from his conflict with Hannibal. 
He became not only the best general at Rome’s disposal but one of the first to embrace deception 
and trickery as a viable military strategy. Scipio went further than Fabius. The Delayer had 
adapted to the circumstances created by fighting Hannibal, but Scipio’s generalship was molded 
by that fighting. He conquered Spain by going after Carthage’s armies directly, as Hannibal had 
done, and ignored the infighting and seducing of the Iberian tribes that had led to his father’s and 
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uncles’ defeat. By attacking Carthage’s outlying dependencies, Scipio changed the momentum of 
the war.
 
CH 6: THE BATTLE OF ZAMA AND THE END OF HANNIBAL 
The Battle of Zama needs scholarly scrutiny because it was Hannibal’s only defeat and 
proved to be the most decisive battle of the war. There are multiple problems with the 
description of the battle by ancient sources. The issues are the battle’s location, the elephant 
corps, and the pro-Roman sources that describe the battle. 
 The exact location of the battle is still unknown. No known monuments, statues, or steles 
indicate the site. It is hard to believe that the Romans did not commission any monuments, but 
archaeologists often cannot locate decisive battles sites. 
Hannibal fielded eighty war elephants against Scipio. Zama was the first time since 
Trebia that Hannibal had been able to deploy elephant cavalry. Fighting in his homeland with a 
trained corps of war elephants seems like a huge advantage, but there are no elephant troops 
mentioned in the battles leading up to Zama. Scipio had already fought Carthaginian armies at 
Utica and the Great Plains before Hannibal arrived in North Africa, and at neither point did he 
encounter elephants. However, at Zama, Hannibal was supposedly able to call up nearly eighty 
of them. The elephants allegedly became frightened by the yelling, shield banging, and other 
noises. This behavior is unlikely, despite their natural tendency to panic, given that animals 
trained for war tend to disregard the general noises that accompany a battle.  
Polybius and Livy detailed Scipio’s strategy to negate the elephant charge. Scipio set 
long corridors in his infantry formation and screened the corridors using skirmishers. Hannibal’s 
elephants passed through these aisles and at the end of them were killed with javelins, driven 
away, or turned back into their formations. Driven mad by their wounds, these elite war beasts 
ran amok. Each elephant carried a mahout on its back. If the mahouts did lose control of their 




the head, as at the earlier battle of the Metaurus.176 Hannibal’s mahouts likely tried to use the 
same tactic, but they were severely wounded by missiles or thrown off their elephants.  
According to Polybius, Hannibal’s cavalry was driven off early on by Massinissa. The 
Greek historian describes Hannibal’s mercenaries and his Carthaginian regulars turning against 
each other. As the mercenaries attempt to withdraw, Hannibal orders his men to lower their 
spears, forcing the mercenaries to “take refuge on the wings or make for the open country.”177 
The idea that Hannibal, a man who had campaigned for fifteen years in hostile territory, was 
unable to coordinate his regular and mercenary troops is questionable. Polybius’ description of 
the cowardice of the Carthaginian regulars makes little sense since these men’s lives, honor, and 
wealth, as well as their wives and children, were at risk. There was no gain in hanging back and 
allowing the outnumbered mercenaries to fight the battle. Hannibal likely led his line of battle 
with his mercenary and inexperienced troops, followed by his veterans. As each of these lines 
lost ground to the advancing Roman formation, they fell back and reorganized on the wings, 
leaving the spent Roman hastati and principes to face fresh, veteran troops while being slowly 
flanked.178 This strategy is similar to Cannae without the complete cavalry entrapment, though 
this might have been part of his complete plan.  
In Polybius’s account, Scipio reorganized his line of battle to equal the width of the 
Carthaginians. He placed his veterans on the wings to avoid Hannibal’s flanking maneuver. This 
report is difficult to accept from Polybius without question. At the pivotal point, with Rome’s 
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cavalry bound to return at any moment, it seems strange that Hannibal, master of ambush tactics, 
would have allowed Scipio time to reorganize his line of battle. Instead, the two sides met, 
“being nearly equal in numbers, spirit, courage, and arms, and the battle was for a long time 
undecided.”179 The two sides were equally matched in strength and number. The Romans had 
fought through two lines of Carthaginian infantry and were likely more tired than their 
counterparts. Emboldened, the Romans charged the ordered ranks of Hannibal’s veterans in a 
single line. The battle raged for an unknown amount of time, until the Numidian cavalry allied to 
Rome returned and attacked the Carthaginian rear and flanks, routing Hannibal’s army. 
Hannibal’s advantage in pitched battle always resided in the superior quality and number 
of his cavalry. Surprise, flanking maneuvers, and ambush only served to empower his cavalry as 
the arm of decision. Without them, his trickery and skill had no means of expression. At Zama, 
though, it was Scipio who had the advantage in cavalry. His Numidian allies had the skill and 
strength in numbers to negate Hannibal’s usual tactics. That is why Hannibal arrayed his infantry 
into three lines to mirror Roman tactics and formation. Each component of his infantry (his 
veterans, Carthaginian/Libyan infantry, and the Ligurian, Gallic, and Balearic cohorts) were 
distinct groups that had not served together long enough to be a coherent and effective force. 
Hannibal’s creation of three lines was likely to make it easier to deploy the disparate elements in 
his army, but the battle was lost because the Romans had better cavalry in higher numbers. Their 
infantry was superior as well, evenly matching Hannibal’s veteran infantry. Three years of hard 
fighting in Spain had welded the Roman infantry into one of the most capable armies the Roman 
                                              
 




military system ever produced. The only argument for Roman trickery or deception at Zama was 
in Scipio’s apparent handling of the Carthaginian elephant corps.  
Elephants at Zama 
Indian armies were the first to use elephants as shock cavalry. Alexander the Great 
encountered them in 331 in the Indus valley. This new weapon traveled back with Alexander’s 
successors to the Mediterranean. In the 270s, Pyrrhus of Epirus used elephants in Italy against 
the Romans and in Sicily against the Carthaginians. Hannibal’s forebears were quick to adapt to 
this tactic. They domesticated the now-extinct African forest elephants and used them as cavalry. 
Elephants subsequently became synonymous in the ancient world with Carthage. In Spain, 
Carthaginian coins depicted an elephant on one side.  
Logistics and numbers limited pachyderm effectiveness during the Second Punic War. 
The amount of forage required to keep an elephant fit for battle is enormous. Elephants create a 
supply problem that virtually negates their advantage in battle. Shean estimates nearly two 
hundred pack animals were needed to transport their rations.180 The only battles where Hannibal 
deployed elephants were at the river Tagus, Trebia, and Zama in 220, 218, and 202, respectively. 
At Trebia, Hannibal’s elephants disrupted the Roman infantry formation and scattered their 
Gallic auxiliaries. The discord that the elephants caused among men and horses not used to their 
presence made them worth the risk to Hannibal.  
At Zama, Scipio Africanus used the flexible manipular formation to defuse the elephant 
charge. For the sake of argument, if Scipio’s formation did negate the eighty-odd elephant 
charge, then the alleys created by the Roman infantry formation is a deceptive tactical maneuver.  
                                              
 




There was no other subterfuge before or during the battle. Hannibal and Scipio both 
arrayed their infantry in three lines opposite each other with cavalry on both flanks. The only 
difference was that Hannibal had a large corps of war elephants stationed at the front of his lines. 
Everyone on the field knew Hannibal’s plan was a mass elephant charge, the exact tactic used by 
Xanthippus during Regulus’ invasion in the First Punic War. Scipio’s response was by the book. 
Here is Polybius describing the battle as it regards the elephants: 
The rest of the elephants charged the Roman velites in the spaces between the maniples 
of the line, and while inflicting much damage on the enemy suffered severely; until, 
becoming frightened, some of them ran away down the vacant spaces, the Romans letting 
them pass harmlessly along, according to Scipio's orders…181 
 
Scipio’s taking advantage of the size of the battlefield and allowing his forces to space 
themselves accordingly was his deception. Hannibal might have figured that the number of his 
elephants and the skill of their mahouts would overcome the enemy they faced. 
The Battle of Zama was the final pitched battle of the war. After his defeat, Hannibal 
returned to Carthage and advised the Senate to sue for peace. The terms were harsh. Rome 
confiscated Carthage’s overseas territories, destroyed its fleet of warships, and charged a tribute 
of ten thousand talents a year for fifty years. Most galling of all, the Carthaginians gave up their 
sovereign right to make war. The noble families of the city gave up political hostages to ensure 
observance of the treaty terms. The title “Friends and Allies” of the Roman people meant 
avoiding annihilation, but it was clear that Carthage had become subordinate to Rome in their 
own African homeland.  
                                              
 




Almost five hundred ships, according to some of Livy’s sources, were burned in the open 
water outside of Carthage’s harbor. It seems odd that Carthage still had five hundred ships since 
(a) Hannibal did not have the ships to mount a maritime invasion of the Italian Peninsula, (b) 
Roman domination of the western Mediterranean prevented reinforcing Hannibal in Italy, and (c) 
Carthage could not prevent a Roman landing in North Africa. Building of these ships, training 
their crews, and equipping and maintaining both the ships and the men require time and money, 
which are further restricting factors. If Carthage had or gained enough resources during the war 
to build five hundred ships, there was no reason not to use their naval potential better. Carthage 
had reinforced Hannibal in Italy a few times through its Greek ports in the south. Over his ten 
years in Italy, though, it does not seem that they actually supplied nearly enough. While the 
claim that Hannibal was operating on his own against the will of the Carthaginian government is 
false, it does seem as if factions in Carthage prevented the full might of its military from 
supporting Hannibal.  
By 196, Hannibal was elected suffete.182 He spent his time in office attempting to 
institute financial and political reform in Carthage. Hannibal revised the tax system to alleviate 
the burden of the war indemnity from ordinary citizens. In doing so, he attacked the oligarchical 
faction in the Council of Elders, who were misappropriating state funds. His work led to the 
repayment of all the sums embezzled by the Elders and the full payment of the war debt to 
Rome. It appeared for a time that the Barcid dynasty was still influential in Carthage.  
Barcid political hegemony was coming to an end. The oligarchs who had been targeted 
by Hannibal’s financial reforms sought revenge against the former Barcid general. They wrote 
                                              
 




letters to the Roman Senate, accusing Hannibal of plotting another war. An embassy was sent to 
Carthage to take Hannibal into custody, but he managed to escape into exile. He went first to 
Tyre, the city from which Carthage’s founder Dido had reportedly sailed almost six centuries 
before. He spent the rest of his life in the courts of Eastern monarchs and even convinced 
Antiochus III of the Seleucid Empire to begin a war with Rome. Hannibal hoped that this 
Hellenistic monarch could succeed where he had failed in stopping Roman expansion. When 
Antiochus failed, and being without further recourse, Hannibal committed suicide in 183 in 
Bithynia.183 The Barcids had spent almost eight decades attempting to defeat Rome. Their failure 
eventually led to the downfall of Carthaginian civilization. 
CONCLUSION 
Hannibal’s personal experience in war, the legacy of his father Hamilcar, his Greek tutor 
Sosylus, and, most importantly, the formal Greek education he had received directly influenced 
his strategic and tactical decisions in Italy. His battle at Cannae is the prime example and product 
of his Greek education. The double envelopment executed through superior cavalry and infantry 
on the flanks is typical Barcid military strategy. His father’s tactics in Sicily convinced Hannibal 
that lightning-style raiding was more profitable than long, vulnerable sieges such as the one 
Hannibal had endured at Saguntum from 219-218. Hannibal learned the value of speed, surprise, 
and guerrilla tactics from his wars against the Spanish. Overall, the war in Italy reflected his 
understanding of the Greek art of war. Though ultimately beaten, Hannibal deserves to stand 
alongside the other master tacticians and strategists of the ancient world.  
   How Hannibal saw himself is imperative for understanding the decisions that he made 
                                              
 




while on the campaign and the effect he had on the overall outcome of any given operation. 
Hannibal saw himself among the greatest generals in history, as he himself told Scipio Africanus 
years after the war, while he was an advisor in the Seleucid court.184 Hannibal reasoned that he 
had conquered Iberia and led an army over the Alps like Hercules. His military accomplishments 
were formidable despite his ultimate failure. Throughout his Italian campaign, his army never 
lost any significant, decisive engagements. Hannibal defeated three separate Roman consular 
armies, and at Cannae he had defeated the greatest Roman force ever assembled. No significant 
conspiracies or mutinies plagued his army, which behaved as a well-trained fighting force 
entirely at the disposal of its commander. Though ultimately unsuccessful, Hannibal’s tactical 
and strategic genius are underestimated by scholars. Overall, Hannibal’s legacy was defined by 
the objectives he failed to meet: he never managed to defeat Rome or stop its expansion 
throughout the Mediterranean.  
Hannibal was a great leader, but he was human and made avoidable mistakes. He was not 
the godless terror that the Roman sources paint, but neither was he the infallible underdog some 
modern writers want to idolize. His initial campaign strategy was bold and promised a big 
payoff, but after 216, Hannibal did not adapt his strategy to compete against a government 
unwilling to surrender or compromise. He continued to use innovative tactics, but the Romans 
eventually saw their worth and began to copy them. Scipio adapted to great effect in Spain when 
he cut Hannibal off from his supply base and eventually forced him back to North Africa, where 
Hannibal met his defeat at Zama. Even in defeat, Hannibal’s tactics and strategies earn him a 
place alongside Alexander and Caesar in a listing of the ancient world’s greatest military minds.
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